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Executive Summary
Policymakers in the United States increasingly 
recognize that drug use should be treated as a 
public health issue instead of a criminal issue. 
Most, however, continue to support harsh criminal 
sentences for people who are involved with drug 
selling or distribution. Many imagine these people 
are “predators” or “pushers” who force drugs on the 
vulnerable, contributing to addiction, overdose and 
violent crime.1 
With more than 68,000 people in the U.S. dying from 
accidental drug overdose in 2018 alone,2 many people are 
searching for someone to blame. Pointing the finger at people 
who sell drugs is, in some ways, a natural emotional response 
to loss of this magnitude. It is also consistent with decades 
of drug policies based on the assumption that people who 
sell or distribute drugs are responsible for causing drug use. 
Politicians of all stripes have argued that long sentences for 
drug sellers will reduce drug availability and make remaining 
drugs more expensive, driving down demand. But this is not 
how drug markets actually work.3
Imprisoning people who sell drugs does not reduce the drug 
supply, increase drug prices, or prevent drug use. As Mark 
Kleiman, a highly-regarded drug policy expert, has explained, 
“We did the experiment. In 1980, we had about 15,000 
people behind bars for drug dealing. And now we have about 
450,000 people behind bars for drug dealing. And the prices 
of all major drugs are down dramatically. So if the question is 
do longer sentences lead to higher drug prices and therefore 
less drug consumption, the answer is no.”4 When a person 
who sells drugs is imprisoned, they are inevitably replaced 
by a new recruit or by remaining sellers, as long as demand 
remains unaffected.5 A Maryland police officer once described 
arresting drug sellers as “playing whack-a-mole” and “banging 
your head against a wall,” because they can be so efficiently 
replaced.6
Framing people who sell drugs as perpetrators and people 
who use drugs as victims is also misguided because there is 
extensive overlap between these two groups. A 2012 survey 
found that 43% of people who reported selling drugs in 
the past year also reported that they met the criteria for a 
substance use disorder.7 In addition, laws against drug selling 
are so broadly written that it is easy for people caught with 
drugs for personal use to get charged as dealers, even if they 
were not involved in selling at all. Politicians and prosecutors 
who say they want a public health approach to drug use, but 
harsh criminal penalties for anyone who sells, are in many 
cases calling for the imprisonment and non-imprisonment of 
the very same people.8 
Beyond being merely ineffective, the harsh criminalization of 
supply-side drug market activity may actually make drug use 
more dangerous, increasing overdose deaths and leading to 
more violence in communities. Law enforcement crackdowns 
on drug trafficking may incentivize the introduction of 
more potent, riskier drugs such as fentanyl – a synthetic 
opioid 30 to 50 times as potent as heroin9 – into the drug 
supply.10 Aggressive prosecution of people who sell drugs 
may undermine 911 Good Samaritan laws, making it less 
likely that people will call 911 at the scene of an overdose.11 
Indiscriminately putting people who sell drugs in prison also 
means removing trusted sellers from communities, forcing 
users to buy from people they don’t know and making an 
already unregulated and unpredictable drug supply even less 
predictable.12
The relationship between drug markets and violence is 
complicated. In some contexts, drug prohibition has fueled 
organized crime and been associated with horrific violence 
and corruption.13 But drug markets are much more diverse 
than stereotypes suggest: many of them experience little or 
no serious violence, while many markets that sometimes do 
experience violence operate relatively nonviolently most of the 
time.14 Law enforcement crackdowns may actually increase 
violence in these markets by disrupting the interpersonal 
relationships and territorial agreements that keep some drug 
markets operating smoothly.15   
While different individuals who work on the supply side 
of the drug economy have differing goals, priorities and 
knowledge levels about drug safety and harm reduction, there 
is evidence that some people who sell drugs take steps to 
ensure that their clients stay as safe as possible.16 Some people 
who use drugs report high levels of trust in the people from 
whom they buy, although in an unregulated drug market even 
the most ethical drug sellers have limited ability to know the 
composition of the product they are selling.17
The current system of supply-side criminalization 
disproportionately impacts people at the lowest levels of drug 
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supplying hierarchies. Available data suggest that the vast 
majority of people in prison for drug selling or distribution 
are not high-level suppliers or “kingpins”18 and have no 
history of violent conduct.19 The current system also has a 
discriminatory impact on communities of color,20 despite 
the fact that the available data suggest that white people are 
slightly more likely than either Black or Latinx people to 
report having sold drugs.21
Our current approach to people who sell or distribute 
drugs in the United States does not reduce the harms 
of drug use or improve public safety. It is built on a 
foundation of stigma, ignorance and fear rather than 
evidence, and creates new problems while doing nothing to 
solve those that already exist. 
The Drug Policy Alliance believes it is time to rethink the 
“drug dealer”. We must urgently assess what type of people 
actually fall into this category and how we as a society 
can respond to them in ways that will keep people and 
communities safer and healthier. Despite the challenges of 
discussing supply-side drug policy reform in the midst of 
an overdose crisis, we cannot be silent while policymakers 
repeat the discriminatory, ineffective, expensive and 
dangerous mistakes of the past. 
“I served my time. I should go back home.” — Miguel Perez Jr.
(Read his story on p. 39)
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Recommendations
Our recommendations are based on three broad principles. 
First, to the maximum extent possible, society should deal 
with drug-involvement outside the destructive apparatus of 
criminalization – and to the extent that the criminal justice 
system continues to focus on drug selling and distribution, it 
must do so with a commitment to proportionality and due 
process. Second, we should focus on reducing the harms of 
drug distribution (for example, reducing drug market-related 
violence), rather than attempting to eliminate drug market 
activity. Third, we must take seriously the criminal justice 
system’s discriminatory response to the drug trade, and work 
toward reforms that both repair the harm already done while 
preventing further harm to communities of color and poor 
communities.
There are many steps that police, prosecutors, policymakers, 
service providers, researchers, advocates, journalists and other 
cultural influencers can take to mitigate some of the worst 
aspects of the current system. People who are or have been 
involved in drug selling or distribution must be included from 
start to finish in developing these reforms.
Below is the beginning of a reform agenda – a series of 
incremental measures that advocates can start pursuing 
immediately. But beyond these steps, we must rethink the way 
we approach drug selling- and distribution-related activity 
on a more fundamental level. To this end, we conclude 
with a series of questions that we hope will spur further 
discussion about how to develop a comprehensive reform 
agenda for drug markets and those who work in them. Our 
recommendations and questions for further discussion can be 
found in full on p. 52; they are summarized below.
For police and prosecutors: 
Police and prosecutors should treat drug law violations as 
possession for personal use unless there is clear evidence that 
a person was involved in selling or distribution for extensive 
financial gain. In most cases, they should deprioritize 
arresting, charging and prosecuting people for conduct 
related to selling and distribution alone. Instead, they 
should focus on enforcing laws against threats, coercion, 
exploitation, corruption and conduct that causes physical 
harm to another person. 
Prosecutors should decline to prosecute certain selling- and 
distribution-related offenses altogether, such as: sharing or 
giving away drugs for free; subsistence selling; selling by 
people who are struggling to control their own drug use; drug-
induced homicide charges; and conspiracy charges against 
low-level actors in drug supplying hierarchies. They should 
also stop prosecuting the family members of people who 
sell drugs for conduct that does not constitute substantive 
involvement in drug selling or distribution, such as witnessing 
drug transactions or taking phone messages related to drug 
selling. 
For local, state and federal policymakers:
Policymakers should urgently reform all criminal laws 
and sentencing guidelines that result in disproportionate 
punishments for people convicted of drug selling- or 
distribution-related law violations. This includes reforming 
criminal history sentencing enhancements, expanding safety 
valve provisions, and eliminating mandatory minimum 
sentences. They should also repeal drug-induced homicide 
laws. In jurisdictions that specify weight thresholds for 
possession, lawmakers should review and revise these 
thresholds to ensure they reflect the amount of a drug that 
people who use drugs could be reasonably expected to possess, 
thus minimizing the number of people who possess drugs 
solely for personal use who are punished for drug selling or 
distribution. 
Expanding 911 Good Samaritan laws to decriminalize 
selling- and distribution-related law violations at the scene of 
an overdose will encourage more bystanders to save lives by 
calling 911 without fear of arrest. Lawmakers should also take 
steps to ensure that people who have been convicted of drug 
selling or distribution are able to successfully reintegrate into 
their communities and access stable, legal income streams 
upon their release. This includes repealing laws, revising 
policies, and eliminating practices that obstruct access to 
housing, employment, education, professional licensing, and 
access to credit and financial aid on the basis of a person’s 
criminal record, as well as providing funding for reentry 
programs that support people leaving jail or prison.
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Finally, federal policymakers should take significant steps 
to address the impact of drug selling and distribution laws 
on people without citizenship. They should amend federal 
immigration laws and practices to ensure that decision-makers 
in all immigration-related proceedings assess cases on an 
individualized basis, regardless of criminal justice contact; 
limit the amount of time that immigration decision-makers 
can take past criminal justice involvement into account 
in their deliberations; and prohibit decision-makers from 
considering convictions that have been expunged, sealed, 
pardoned, vacated, or are otherwise not recognized by the 
jurisdictions in which they occurred. 
For service providers:
Service providers should equip retail-level drug sellers with 
the information they need to: educate themselves and their 
customers about drug effects and overdose risk; distribute 
sterile drug paraphernalia such as syringes, cookers and pipes; 
provide naloxone training and naloxone to their customers; 
and disseminate drug checking information and supplies 
to screen for adulterants. They should also explore the 
development of community-based mentoring programs led by 
former drug sellers and distributors, to encourage safer selling 
practices and violence reduction.
For advocates, journalists and other cultural 
influencers:
Advocates, journalists and other cultural influencers should 
work to destigmatize, humanize and end the blanket 
demonization of people who sell or distribute drugs. They 
should work to convince policymakers of the nuanced reality 
of supply-side drug market activity, as well as the failures of 
the current system. 
For researchers: 
To develop policy approaches appropriate for the diverse 
reality of supply-side drug market activity, we need 
significantly more comparative research on drug markets, 
including: online and offline drug markets; geographically 
variable markets; changes in drug market dynamics over time; 
drug markets catering to different demographics of clientele; 
indoor and outdoor drug markets; markets where buyers and 
sellers don’t know each other outside of the sales relationship 
and markets that are dominated by social networks; markets 
that are more organized and those that are more casual; 
markets that primarily involve youth buyers and sellers; 
markets that exist in the communities where sellers and/or 
buyers live compared to markets where actors travel from 
elsewhere to engage in transactions; and markets involving a 
variety of different types of drugs.
While pursuing this comparative research agenda, researchers 
should pay particular attention to the factors that lead 
some drug markets to involve violence while others operate 
relatively nonviolently. This information will be crucial to 
the development and evaluation of programs designed to 
stabilize more volatile drug markets. Researchers should 
also continue to explore the impact that law enforcement 
crackdowns on retail-level drug sellers have on people who use 
drugs, including the links between crackdowns and spikes in 
overdose rates and/or drug market-related violence.
Researchers should also more thoroughly assess which policies 
and incentives actually work to get people out of drug selling 
or distribution in a sustainable way, while further exploring 
the role that socioeconomic conditions play in contributing 
to people’s participation in drug markets. They should also 
explore the ways that people who sell drugs are already 
involved in harm reduction initiatives, evaluate the impacts of 
these activities, and analyze existing barriers to their further 
involvement.
Key questions for reformers:
  Absent threats, coercion, exploitation, corruption and 
conduct that cause physical harm to another person, 
should volitional behavior between people related to drug 
selling or distribution be sanctioned? If so, on what basis?
  To the extent that it is necessary to do so, how should 
decision-makers determine whether someone possesses 
drugs solely for personal use or whether they are also 
involved in selling or distribution? 
  To the extent that drawing a distinction between 
low-level sellers and distributors and other sellers and 
distributors may be strategically necessary when pursuing 
reform, how should this determination be made? 
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Recommendations, cont.
  To the extent that proportionate punishment may be 
appropriate for some distribution-related activity, how 
should we assess proportionality?  
  What factors lead some drug markets to involve violent 
interactions, while others operate nonviolently? 
  Are there circumstances in which it is legitimate for drug 
selling- and distribution-related penalties to vary by drug 
type, and if so on what basis?
  What modes of accountability other than incarceration 
are appropriate responses to drug market-related conduct 
that merits intervention or sanction? 
  How can policymakers best address the economic 
challenges and lack of opportunity that push many 
people into the illegal drug economy?
  What are the potential advantages of legally regulating 
drugs? What are the risks, and how can we mitigate 
them? What models of drug regulation would reduce 
drug market violence, enhance consumer safety, and 
maximize public health? (see text box on p. 9)
  If we transition to the legal regulation of drugs, how can 
we do so in a way that repairs the harms to individuals 
and communities wrought by the criminalization of drug 
selling and distribution? How can we ensure that people 
who previously supported themselves through illegal 





Policymakers in the United States increasingly recognize that 
drug use should be treated as a public health instead of a 
criminal issue. While politicians have been slow to actually 
undo the criminalizing apparatus of the drug war, and people 
of color who use drugs still do not receive the same sympathy 
as white and more affluent users, the mainstreaming of a 
public health approach to drug use represents a significant 
shift.
The softening of public opinion has not extended to people 
involved in drug selling or distribution, as politicians on both 
sides of the aisle have made clear. During the 2016 Republican 
primary, Jeb Bush declared, “For dealers, they ought to be 
put away forever, as far as I’m concerned. But users – I think 
we have to be a second chance country.” In early 2019, Peter 
Neronha, the Democratic Attorney General of Rhode Island, 
announced a proposal to defelonize drug possession, saying 
that it would “refocus our law enforcement efforts where […] 
they truly belong, on drug dealers and not addicts. [But] 
if you deal drugs in any amount, the law remains the same 
– you are a drug dealer and a felon and we will prosecute 
you.”22 2018 Ohio Democratic gubernatorial candidate 
Richard Cordray promised, “As governor, I will work with law 
enforcement to make sure drug dealers are convicted and serve 
long prison sentences, while people who need substance abuse 
treatment can get it in our communities.”23 
In March of 2018, President Donald Trump advocated for 
increasing penalties for drug selling- and distribution-related 
law violations, arguing that people who sell or distribute 
drugs “kill thousands of people over the course of their lives 
through drugs.”24 State Senator Scott Cyrway, in support of 
a 2017 bill in Maine, even claimed that “there’s no difference 
between [people who sell drugs] and ISIS. It’s just a different 
method.”25 
People who sell drugs continue to be seen as predators who 
force drugs on the vulnerable, contributing to addiction, 
overdose and violent crime. The demonization of people who 
sell drugs in the context of the overdose crisis is a reiteration 
of a much older story: a deeply racialized narrative in which 
illegal drug use is driven by drug sellers (often portrayed as 
people of color) who push drugs on vulnerable people (often 
white people) to get them hooked.26
This narrative has underpinned the United States’ response 
to drug selling activity for decades. In 1951 the New York 
Times reported that “[a drug seller] is worse than a murderer 
who shoots and kills and that is the end of it. […] He kills 
hundreds of people, slowly but surely.”27 In 1966, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson expressed some sympathy for people who 
use drugs, while advocating for “full criminal sanctions against 
those ruthless men who sell despair.”28 
Politicians of all stripes have argued that long sentences for 
people who sell drugs will reduce drug availability and make 
remaining drugs more expensive, driving down demand. But 
this is not how drug markets work. The United States has 
harshly criminalized people who sell drugs for decades, and 
over this period there has been no significant decrease in drug 
use or the availability of drugs.29 
Beyond merely ineffective, the harsh criminalization of 
supply-side drug market activity may actually be making drug 
use more dangerous, increasing overdose deaths and leading 
to additional violence in communities.30 Law enforcement 
crackdowns on drug trafficking may be incentivizing the 
introduction of more potent, riskier drugs such as fentanyl 
into the drug supply.31 Harsh prosecution of even the lowest 
level drug suppliers is undermining 911 Good Samaritan laws, 
making it less likely that people will call 911 at the scene of an 
overdose.32 Indiscriminately putting people who sell drugs in 
prison is removing trusted sellers from communities, forcing 
users to buy from people they don’t know and making an 
already unpredictable drug supply even less predictable.33
Our current approach to people who sell or distribute drugs 
in the United States does not reduce the harms of drug use 
or the availability of drugs, nor does it improve public safety. 
It is built on a foundation of stigma, ignorance and fear 
rather than evidence and creates new problems while doing 
nothing to solve those that already exist. The Drug Policy 
Alliance believes it is time to rethink the “drug dealer.” We 
must urgently assess how drugs are sold and how we as a 
society can respond in ways that will actually keep people 
and communities safer and healthier. Despite the challenges 
of discussing supply-side drug policy reform in the midst of 
an overdose crisis, we cannot be silent while policymakers 
repeat the discriminatory, ineffective, expensive and dangerous 
mistakes of the past. 
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Introduction, cont.
International dimensions of drug selling
Drug markets are extremely diverse. Some are entirely 
domestic, while others cross international borders. Some 
are small-scale, localized markets, while others involve large 
transnational organizations and generate millions of dollars 
in profit. This report focuses on supply-side drug market 
activity that occurs within the United States, although some 
of this activity is connected to more expansive international 
supply chains.
Dynamics related to the supply of drugs – cultivation, 
production, transit and sale – differ widely depending on 
national and regional contexts. As this report focuses on 
people involved with domestic portions of drug supply 
chains, some of its conclusions are not generalizable to 
supply chains in other countries. An in-depth discussion of 
the international dimensions of drug selling and distribution 
is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is important 
to situate the domestic drug market within this broader 
international context.
In many countries, the illegal drug trade – combined with 
the enforcement of drug prohibition – is accompanied by 
large-scale violence and corruption. This is especially true 
for countries that are the principal producers of crops used 
to manufacture illegal substances – coca and poppy in 
particular – and countries with weak and/or underfunded 
state institutions.34
In Mexico, for instance, around 200,000 people have been 
murdered and over 28,000 reported as disappeared since 
2007, when former President Felipe Calderón launched a 
militarized offensive against drug trafficking organizations.35 
While security forces have perpetrated widespread abuses, 
drug trafficking organizations are also responsible for serious 
crimes, including killings, disappearances and kidnappings.36 
Impunity is rampant, human rights violations are pervasive, 
and reporters are routinely murdered for reporting on drug 
trafficking.37
The current violence in Mexico mirrors in many ways the 
decades of ongoing drug war violence in Colombia. Starting 
in the 1970s, powerful organizations such as the Medellin, 
Cali and Norte del Valle Cartels have engaged in kidnappings, 
torture, murder and forced disappearances. After the 
dissolution of the large organizations, loose criminal networks 
emerged to control parts of the illegal drug trade,38 along 
with left-wing guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitary 
forces. The illegal drug market has fueled the growth and 
expansion of these groups, which have in turn engaged in 
mass atrocities to seize and maintain control of territory, as 
well as widespread corruption of authorities, even at some of 
the highest levels of government.39
Similar patterns are present in Afghanistan, where poppy 
cultivation is a major source of funding for both the Taliban 
and competing armed groups and criminal organizations.40
There are also factors beyond drug selling and distribution 
that drive these high rates of violence. Colombia’s war has 
been profoundly political, and criminal organizations in 
Mexico engage in other illegal activities as well as drug 
trafficking. However, drug trafficking provides the most 
substantial source of income for these organizations.41 
Within these large and often violent drug supplying 
organizations are a wide range of actors who partake in an 
array of individual conduct – from those who transport small 
amounts of drugs for little economic remuneration to those 
who direct the whole network and accrue huge profits. Just 
as we will discuss in the case of the domestic drug market, 
these actors tend to get lumped together under the label “drug 
trafficker,” obscuring the need for diverse policy responses to 
people who fall into this broad category. Drug policy reform 
must take into account different levels of involvement in 
the drug trade and individual conduct when considering 
alternative approaches to criminalization and prohibition 
abroad, as well as at home. 
There have been some examples of reform for people who sell 
or distribute drugs in Latin America that aim to introduce 
proportionality in sentencing. In 2008 for example, under the 
leadership of then-President Rafael Correa, Ecuador declared 
an amnesty for people imprisoned for a one-time offense of 
trafficking small quantities of drugs, which led to the release 
of 2,300 people from prison.42 In 2013, Costa Rica approved 
a bill that grants judges the discretion to reduce prison 
sentences or select alternatives to imprisonment for women 
who are convicted of smuggling drugs into prisons when the 
woman is in poverty, the head of an economically precarious 
household, or responsible for a minor, elder, or someone with 
a disability.43 
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Looking Ahead: Legal Regulation of Drugs
As this report details, drug prohibition has been an abject 
failure that has resulted in untold human misery.  We have 
proposed incremental reforms to mitigate some of the 
worst injustices that stem from the criminalization of people 
who sell drugs. These are important and needed changes. 
But ultimately, we need to completely interrupt the system 
of violence, corruption and profit-making that flows from 
the global market for illegal drugs. This means considering 
innovative models for ending prohibition and implementing 
a system for the legal regulation of drugs.
The reality is that a demand for drugs exists now and 
has throughout human history. Prohibition pushes the 
production and sale of these underground, empowering 
organized crime and creating systems where corruption 
and violence can flourish, while the substances themselves 
cannot be regulated in ways that protect the health and 
safety of consumers. In five decades, the drug war has 
done little if anything to stem the cultivation, production, 
sale and use of drugs; instead, it has contributed to the 
development of ever more potent and dangerous drugs, 
such as fentanyl. Because many popular, sought-after 
substances are illegal, there is a continual market incentive 
to tweak chemical formulas to create similar, often more 
potentially harmful, analog substances like fentanyl, and 
hundreds of other novel psychoactive substances. 
As the failure of the war on drugs becomes ever clearer 
and the need to find solutions to protect the health and 
safety of individuals, families, and communities becomes 
more urgent, we are increasingly seeing a global 
movement calling for the thoughtful regulation of previously 
illegal substances. Marijuana legalization in the U.S. 
and elsewhere is one example. Leading health officials 
in Canada have turned their attention to creating a safe 
supply of legal opioids to address the overdose crisis there, 
while efforts to legally regulate psychedelics are taking root 
in the United States. In countries like Colombia, there’s a 
nascent movement to regulate cocaine. 
In a 2018 report calling for the legal regulation of all drugs, 
the Global Commission on Drug Policy noted:
A fundamental question regarding illegal drugs is still 
rarely asked. Who should assume the control of these 
substances that bear serious risks for health – the 
state or organized crime? We are convinced that the 
only responsible answer is to regulate the market, to 
establish regulations adapted to the dangerousness 
of each drug, and to monitor and enforce these 
regulations. 
DPA believes that it is time to start a serious conversation 
about the legal regulation of drugs. While we do not yet have 
all the answers, it is time that our movement, policymakers 
and society at large begin to tackle fundamental questions. 
What regulatory tools could we use to better address the 
potential risks of drug use as well as the harms of drug 
prohibition? What are the potential advantages of legally 
regulating drugs? What models of drug regulation would 
reduce drug market violence and corruption, enhance 
consumer safety, and maximize public health? How do we 
adapt these models to different types of drugs? How can 
we design a regulatory system that minimizes the potential 
harms of commercialization and marketing? If we transition 
to the legal regulation of drugs, how can we do so in a 
way that repairs the harms to individuals and communities 
wrought by prohibition? How can we ensure that people who 
previously supported themselves through illegal drug market 
activity have access to legal, sustainable and dignified 
income sources?
We cannot wait to address the pressing problems currently 
facing people who sell drugs. But we can and should begin 
talking seriously about when and how we ultimately end 
prohibition and implement sensible forms of drug regulation 
that would not only eliminate the illegal market and the 
problems associated with it, but also protect the health and 
safety of our society.
While proposing incremental reforms to mitigate some 
of the worst injustices produced by the criminalization 
of people who sell or distribute drugs, we recognize that 
ultimately only the end of drug prohibition can interrupt 
these international dynamics of violence, corruption and 
profit-making that characterize some portions of the global 
market for illegal drugs. 
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Terminology 
The criminal justice system treats “people who sell and 
distribute drugs” as a very broad category: although there are 
minor variations between jurisdictions, in general anyone 
who is involved in getting drugs from one person to another, 
as opposed to people who acquire drugs exclusively for their 
own use, may be prosecuted as a “drug dealer.” As we discuss 
later in the report, however, the line between people who sell 
drugs and people who use drugs is much blurrier than most 
people think.
We use terms like “people who sell or distribute drugs,” 
“people who are involved with drug selling or distribution,” 
“people who supply drugs,” and minor variations on these 
terms to describe this group of people. This is a vast category 
that includes a wide range of roles in drug supply chains. It 
comprises everyone from those near the top of the distribution 
chain (sometimes referred to as “kingpins”) to street-level 
sellers who never sell more than a very small amount of a drug 
at a time. 
Some distributors transport drugs from one place to another 
without ever interacting with users, while others oversee 
a supply network without ever coming in contact with 
drugs. Some drug suppliers are mid-level, purchasing drugs 
in wholesale quantities and reselling to other sellers and 
distributors, while others are merely involved in transporting 
these wholesale quantities from place to place: they may be 
caught with large amounts of a substance, but actually play 
a very low-level role in the supply chain. People involved 
with drug selling or distribution also include those who are 
involved with growing or manufacturing drugs, a category 
that is itself very broad: it includes everyone from people who 
illegally grow a few marijuana plants to those involved in 
larger-scale production.
People involved in drug selling or distribution also include 
those who buy a few doses of a drug to resell at cost to 
friends or family, or who broker drug transactions by 
connecting a potential buyer to a seller. Many jurisdictions 
even prosecute sharing drugs – when no money is exchanged 
– as a sales or distribution offense. Others involved in drug 
selling or distribution play parts in supply networks that are 
only tenuously related to drug transactions themselves: they 
act as lookouts or bodyguards, answer phone calls, or pass 
on messages.
Some researchers have suggested that lumping all these people 
together in a single category is inappropriate. They suggest 
that people who exchange drugs for money and make a profit 
should be distinguished from those involved in the supply side 
of the drug economy who do not meet this criteria.44 Some 
also argue that those who participate in “social supply” – 
providing family or friends with drugs for little or no financial 
gain – are not truly drug sellers.45 Others suggest that brokers 
are not drug sellers, since they merely connect an interested 
user with a seller or purchase drugs on someone else’s behalf.46
However, we have chosen to discuss all of these actors under 
the banner of people who sell or distribute drugs because 
this categorization reflects the current reality of who is 
criminalized for drug selling or distribution. Today’s laws 
against supply-side drug market activity have the potential to 
punish anyone involved in transferring drugs from one person 
to another – including brokers and those involved in social 
supply – and it is the people targeted by our current system of 
criminal laws that this report seeks to examine.
We avoid common terms like drug dealer, pusher or trafficker 
as much as possible, given the long history of stigmatization 
and the many misconceptions associated with them. We have 
tried to use people-first language as much as practical (e.g. 
“people who sell drugs” instead of “drug sellers”); however, we 
do use “drug sellers,” “drug distributors” or “drug suppliers” in 
situations where doing so optimizes readability.
This report is limited to discussing people who sell or 
distribute substances that are illegal in their jurisdictions. 
It does not include people who sell legal substances in an 
unregulated or criminalized market (for example, people who 
sell marijuana illegally in jurisdictions that legally regulate 
marijuana, or people who sell untaxed cigarettes). It also does 
not discuss issues that arise when someone sells marijuana 
legally in one jurisdiction but is perceived as an illegal seller by 
another jurisdiction that still prohibits marijuana. 
This report also does not cover those who sell or distribute 
drugs in legal markets: people who work at liquor stores or 
pharmacies, for example. While the issues discussed in this 
report are quite removed from those affecting these legal 
sellers and distributors, we recognize that the lines between 
legal and illegal drugs are a creation of criminal laws, not the 
result of inherent differences between drugs that are currently 
legal and those that are not.
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Aron Tuff’s Story 
“I had about $90 in my pocket. 
So naturally I’m selling drugs.”
In 1995, Aron Tuff was sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole after being found near 0.3 
grams of cocaine that had been dropped on the 
ground. He was 39 years old and didn’t know if 
he would ever see his family again. He worried he 
would die in prison.
The night of his arrest, Tuff was in his hometown 
of Moultrie, Georgia. It was evening, and he was 
hanging out in a friend’s front yard with fifteen or 
twenty other people. Suddenly, the police arrived 
and began searching the yard with flashlights. 
The officers found the 0.3 grams of cocaine in the 
grass near where the group had been standing. 
The police arrested Tuff, saying that they saw him 
making “hand motions” and that they had seen 
something fall from his hand. When they searched 
him, they found $90 cash in his pocket.
On this evidence, the prosecutor charged Tuff 
with possession with intent to distribute. In cases 
like Tuff’s involving small amounts of a drug, 
prosecutors have a great deal of discretion to 
decide whether they should charge the person 
as a drug user or a drug seller. Since drug sellers 
are punished much more harshly, the stakes 
of this decision are enormous. As Tuff’s case 
demonstrates, the evidence that prosecutors use 
to support possession with intent to distribute 
charges can be very weak.
Tuff had been in the Army when he was younger 
and had hurt his back. As he grew older, it became 
clear that the injury was more serious than he had 
initially believed. He didn’t have the money to see 
a doctor and used alcohol and drugs to cope with 
the pain. He struggled to control his drug use, and 
it became difficult for him to work and maintain his 
family life. As a result of his addiction, he had four 
previous nonviolent drug charges on his record. 
These previous charges allowed the prosecutors to 
seek a life-without-parole sentence for the cocaine 
charge.
Black people such as Tuff are disproportionately 
likely to be prosecuted for drug offenses compared 
to white people. This means that they are severely 
impacted by sentencing regimes that penalize 
people harshly for previous contact with the 
criminal justice system. Many people, like Tuff, end 
up serving life sentences for a series of minor law 
violations connected to their drug use.
Tuff describes how, despite his frequent contact 
with the system, he was never able to access the 
drug treatment that he wanted: “Back then when 
you went [into the criminal justice system], there 
was no kind of treatment,” he remembers. “I mean, 
they had a class, where they told you the dangers 
of using drugs. They didn’t tell you about support 
groups; they didn’t tell you what to do if you start 
feeling an urge; they didn’t tell you, you can call 
this person here, if you’re feeling weak. We didn’t 
have support groups.”
In 2016, after spending 22 years in prison, Tuff 
won an early release with the help of the Southern 
Center for Human Rights. He is now 63 years old. 
While he was in prison, his mother and brother had 
died, and his children had their own children. “I’m 
not trying to get back the life I lost,” he says. “What 
I want to do, I want to be happy, I want to see my 
family happy. You understand? And I want to see 
my kids grow up, my grandkids grow up.”
Interview conducted September 5, 2018.
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Drug Selling and Distribution
The harsh criminalization of supply-side drug market activity 
has failed to reduce problematic drug use. It does not keep 
people who use drugs safer. It does not decrease (and may 
actually increase) the violence associated with some drug 
markets, while ignoring the fact that the majority of drug 
markets are non-violent. It further marginalizes some of 
the most vulnerable and stigmatized people in our society, 
disproportionately impacting people who use drugs, poor 
people, and people of color. It is built on a foundation of 
racism and originated as part of white society’s desire to 
control communities of color.
Before we consider more effective, evidence-based approaches 
to supply-side drug market activity, we need to understand 
the assumptions that underpin our current system. Below, 
we explore four key misconceptions that drive policymaking 
in this area. Exposing these myths allows us to develop an 
accurate understanding of why the current system is failing 
and how we might effectively change it.
Myth 1: Harshly criminalizing those who 
sell and distribute drugs deters people from 
selling drugs, which will reduce the available 
drug supply and keep communities healthier 
and safer.
Since the early days of the drug war, politicians and journalists 
have perceived the harsh criminalization of people who sell 
or distribute drugs as a way to keep people who use drugs 
safer. They argue that putting sellers and distributors in prison 
will reduce the drug supply, making drugs more expensive 
and consequently reducing demand.47 The bulk of available 
research, however, does not support these claims. It suggests 
that imprisoning people who work on the supply side of the 
drug economy does not result in any sustainable reduction 
in drug use or improve the safety of people who use drugs.48 
Emergency room visits related to drug use drastically increased 
between 1980 and 2011 – a period during which penalties for 
drug selling and distribution also drastically increased.49
Fact: Demand, not supply, drives the majority 
of drug market activity 
In most instances, demand for illegal drugs has driven supply, 
not the other way around – and people who sell or distribute 
drugs have little influence on the demand for drugs. As Dr. 
Lee Hoffer, a medical anthropologist with extensive experience 
doing research with people who sell and distribute drugs, 
commented, “I’ve never met any dealer who actually pushes 
drugs. They kind of sell themselves.” 50 
There are many combinations of reasons that someone 
may start or continue to use illegal drugs. Some people use 
drugs for pleasure,51 while others experience physiological 
dependence and use to stave off withdrawal symptoms. Some 
people use drugs to manage physical pain,52 while others 
seek to control the effects of mental health issues, trauma, 
or structural inequities.53 Some people use drugs because 
the people they are close to also use drugs.54 Despite the 
stereotype of people who sell drugs seeking out and coercing 
new buyers, many sellers avoid new buyers without a current 
buyer vouching for them, for fear of selling to undercover law 
enforcement or someone who may harm them.55 
Fact: Imprisoning people who sell or 
distribute drugs does not make drugs less 
available or more expensive.
When a person who sells or distributes drugs is imprisoned, 
they are replaced by a new recruit or by remaining suppliers, 
as long as demand is unaffected. This is commonly referred 
to as the replacement effect.56 In a 2017 interview, a Hartford 
County, Maryland police officer remarked, “I feel like we’re 
just playing whack-a-mole. Sometimes you feel like you’re just 
banging your head against a wall – because somebody else is 
going to pop up and take that business.”57 New actors entering 
the market can also increase volatility, conflict and potentially 
violence, as discussed further on p. 16.
Macro-level trends also suggest that incarcerating people 
caught selling or distributing drugs does not reduce drug 
availability or increase drug prices. Between 1980 and 2011, 
increasing penalties played a significant role in raising average 
prison sentences for federal drug law violations by 35%. But 
rather than seeing a reduction in drug use or an increase 
in prices over this period, drug use increased while prices 
fell dramatically.58 Between 1980 and 2000 – the height of 
draconian sentencing for suppliers – cocaine and heroin prices 
dropped 80% and 88% respectively, while methamphetamine 
prices dropped 68%.59 As Mark Kleiman, a highly-regarded 
drug policy expert, explained, “We did the experiment. In 
1980, we had about 15,000 people behind bars for drug 
dealing. And now we have about 450,000 people behind bars 
for drug dealing. And the prices of all major drugs are down 
dramatically. So if the question is do longer sentences lead to 
a higher drug price and therefore less drug consumption, the 
answer is no.”60
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Fact: Harshly criminalizing supply-side 
drug market activity may make drug use 
more dangerous and increase overdoses by 
incentivizing the development of more potent, 
riskier drugs.
Policymakers argue that harsh penalties for people who sell or 
distribute drugs keep people who use drugs safer. In reality, 
however, aggressive supply-side criminalization incentivizes 
the development of more potent, riskier drugs. When law 
enforcement cracks down on drug markets, suppliers have an 
incentive to trade in highly concentrated products, which can 
be more easily hidden than less potent, bulkier goods.61 
Prior to the beginning of alcohol Prohibition, for example, 
most people in the U.S. consumed alcohol in relatively 
low-concentration forms, such as wine, beer and cider. Pre-
prohibition, only 40% of the money spent on alcohol in 
the U.S. was spent on high-concentration spirits. But once 
alcohol supply shifted from the legal to the illegal market, 
the amount of money that Americans spent on high-
concentration products like gin and moonshine shot up to 
almost 90%, as suppliers developed products that could be 
transported more unobtrusively.62 
This dynamic may have encouraged the introduction of 
fentanyl into the illegal opioid market, initiated by high-level 
actors at the top of the supply chain.63 While the causes of 
the current overdose crisis are complicated, fentanyl certainly 
plays a significant role: data suggest that deaths involving 
fentanyl more than doubled from 2015 to 2016.64  
In addition to incentivizing the distribution of high 
potency drugs, prohibition may also have encouraged the 
proliferation of new psychoactive substances (NPS). These 
synthetic substances are designed to mimic the effects of 
more common, illegal drugs such as marijuana, ecstasy, 
opioids, cocaine and methamphetamine, but because of 
their distinct chemical composition they may not have yet 
been made illegal in some jurisdictions. When a particular 
NPS is made illegal, drug manufacturers often tweak the 
chemical composition in an effort to stay a step ahead of 
criminalization. Many of these drugs are considerably more 
dangerous and their effects are much less understood than the 
drugs that they are intended to mimic.65
Fact: The current system of supply-side 
criminalization undermines 911 Good 
Samaritan laws, discouraging people from 
calling 911 at the scene of an overdose and 
putting lives at risk.
Our current approach to people who are involved in drug 
selling or distribution also puts people who use drugs at risk 
by undermining 911 Good Samaritan laws. The aim of these 
laws is to ensure that those at the scene of a drug overdose 
are able to call 911 without fear of criminal prosecution.66 
Forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some 
form of 911 Good Samaritan law, but most of these laws only 
protect people from arrest for offenses related to drug use or 
possession, not selling or distribution.67 
People sometimes use drugs with the person who provided 
them with the drugs. This is especially common in situations 
when distribution is happening within a social network. For 
this reason, someone who could be criminalized for supply-
side activity is often present at the scene of an overdose. When 
policymakers exclude selling- and distribution-related offenses 
from 911 Good Samaritan laws, it significantly undermines 
the effectiveness of these laws, and may cost people who 
overdose their lives.68
Fact: Rather than keeping people who use 
drugs safer, laws that criminalize involvement 
in drug selling or distribution also criminalize 
people who use drugs.
Our criminal laws put people who use drugs and people who 
are involved in drug selling or distribution in completely 
separate categories. In reality, however, many people do 
both.69 A study that examined Milwaukee’s drug economy in 
the late 1990s, for example, found that most street-level sellers 
and distributors were not even paid in money, but rather in 
drugs.70 A 2004 Bureau of Justice Statistics report found that 
70% of people incarcerated for drug trafficking in state prison 
used drugs themselves in the month prior to their offense.71 A 
2017 report by the same agency found that 29.9% of people 
in state prison and 28.8% of people sentenced to jail for drug 
law violations between 2007 and 2009 said their offense was 
committed to get drugs or to get money for drugs.72 
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Politicians and prosecutors, who say they want a public health 
approach to drug use but harsh criminal penalties for anyone 
who sells, are in many cases calling for the imprisonment and 
non-imprisonment of the very same people. Furthermore, 
long prison sentences for people who sell or distribute drugs 
make it more challenging for people who use drugs to access 
treatment and health care: many of them will avoid seeking 
help due to stigma or fear of being punished as sellers.73 
For further discussion of how people who use drugs are 
criminalized by laws against drug selling, see p. 36.
Fact: In many cases, people who sell or 
distribute drugs want their clients to be 
satisfied.
People who sell drugs have a range of goals and priorities, as 
well as different levels of knowledge about drug safety, cross-
contamination and safe selling practices. But in many cases, 
people who use drugs acquire them from people they know 
and care about – friends, coworkers or family members – 
who are invested in their well-being.74 Even people who sell 
drugs to people they know less well often want to please their 
customers by providing them with a product that meets their 
needs and keeps them alive. As one seller noted, “Happy 
addicts come back, unhappy ones buy elsewhere, dead ones 
can’t buy anything.”75 In competitive, higher-end drug 
markets or online marketplaces, people who sell or distribute 
rely heavily on their reputation and benefit from being known 
as a source of high quality drugs with predictable composition 
and potency.76 
Qualitative research suggests that individuals who use drugs 
have a range of relationships with and levels of trust in those 
from whom they buy drugs, and it is likely that higher levels 
of trust exist in some markets than others. But significant 
numbers of people who use drugs, even in lower-end drug 
markets, consistently report a high level of trust in these 
relationships.77 A qualitative study from Vancouver, Canada 
found that “participants overwhelmingly discussed a high level 
of trust […] for people who supplied their drugs.” One person 
reported, “I guess we’ve known each other for a long time and 
they’ve always had a good supply and treat me with respect,” 
when discussing  the person from whom she buys drugs. “I 
have been buying off him for 15 years or better. I’m a long-
time customer. I trust my dealer,” said another.78
People who use drugs also reported in this study that many 
people who sell drugs tell them if they are aware of any 
changes in the supply. “I usually buy from the same person 
and it’s always the same. If it isn’t the same, they’ll tell 
me,” said one study participant. “Usually the guy will be 
honest and straight with me, saying if it’s a better batch or 
something,” reported another. “They’ll give me the heads up. 
Most of them are pretty good. They don’t want to lose a good 
customer, right?” Another participant said, “They don’t want 
people to die. I’ve known some dealers that had a bad batch, 
[and said] ‘hold on, give me an hour and I’ll come back.’ They 
are just not selling what they had because it was too strong, 
too weak, too something.”79 A user named Sheryl interviewed 
for a study conducted in Rhode Island reported a similar level 
of responsibility on the part of her regular seller. She described 
how he saw on the news that one of his clients had died of an 
overdose, and called Sheryl right away to tell her to throw out 
any heroin that she had bought from him recently, fearing it 
was contaminated.80
People who use drugs reported that buying from the same 
person, someone they know and who has historically had a 
product with consistent potency, is one of the ways that they 
try to keep themselves safe and prevent overdose.81 In a 2008 
study conducted in New York City, one person who had been 
injecting heroin for 20 years reported that he bought drugs 
from the same person for this entire period: “[My seller] does 
the heroin himself too so he makes sure he gets the same stuff 
all the time. I’ll wait for him. If he can’t get it for a day or two, 
I mean, I’ll take off work and stay home sick waiting for him 
to get. He won’t buy from no one but his connect because he 
knows it’s not cut with pills or nothing and you know what I 
mean, this is the type of person. That’s why I’ve been dealing 
with him for so long.”82 Similarly, someone from Rhode 
Island interviewed for a different study reported, “If he [his 
usual seller] doesn’t take care of me, I go through the sickness 
... I don’t want to die, you know. I don’t want to die.”83 A 
study from Durham, North Carolina found that participants 
reported that they most frequently encountered unexpectedly 
high potency, fentanyl-contaminated heroin when they found 
themselves unable to purchase from someone they knew and 
trusted: “Once I do use different people [to buy drugs from], 
I run across [fentanyl]. If I can’t get my people… Sometimes 
I just wait, you know. Because in the end, like I said, a lot of 
my friends have died.”84
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One person from Vancouver who uses drugs reflected that 
even with the best of intentions, people who sell drugs 
cannot always keep their customers safe in an unregulated 
market. “Sometimes accidents happen,” she said, “but I 
don’t think they do it to rip you off. I just think they do it 
because they don’t know.”85 A participant in the New York 
City study concurred: “You can know your dealer, but you 
don’t know what’s in the bag.”86 People who sell drugs have 
limited ability to accurately know what is in the drugs they 
are selling: even those who do their best to communicate with 
their customers about the composition and potency of their 
product are operating with limited information and should 
not be held responsible for overdose deaths that result from 
the unpredictability of the drug supply. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that at least some people who sell drugs do the best they can 
with the information and resources available to them, warning 
their clients if they change suppliers or become aware of 
people having negative experiences with their product.
Fact: Indiscriminately arresting people 
who sell drugs may be putting lives at 
risk by removing trusted sellers from 
communities and making access to an 
already unpredictable drug supply even less 
predictable.
Multiple studies suggest that buying drugs from a single 
trusted person is an important strategy that many people who 
use drugs employ to keep themselves safe in an unpredictable 
market: as discussed above, while low-level sellers have no way 
of knowing the exact content and potency of their products, 
some still do their best to warn their customers if they notice 
any changes in their supply.87 
Researchers have speculated that increasing law enforcement 
focus on arresting low-level drug sellers might be playing a 
role in rising overdose rates.88 “[R]emoving trusted sellers 
from the community,” one Durham, North Carolina-based 
study notes:
may have the opposite of the intended effect. People who 
use drugs consequently may be forced to  obtain heroin 
from people they do not know and, according to our 
participants, purchasing from an unknown source more 
frequently results in a fentanyl-induced overdose. Similar 
patterns have been observed in Manchester, NH, where 
first responders have informally reported localized spikes 
in overdoses immediately following law enforcement 
interdiction in the local drug market.89
Fact: People who sell drugs have significant 
potential to assist with harm reduction efforts.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many sellers play an even 
more active role in keeping their clients safe by participating 
in harm reduction initiatives. Louise Vincent, the executive 
director of the Urban Survivors Union, a national drug users’ 
union (profiled on p. 33), reports teaching people who sell 
drugs to educate their clients about overdose risk and how 
to access naloxone.90 Several sellers recently interviewed by 
researchers spoke of their commitment to carrying naloxone, 
with one stating, “I felt like it was my responsibility if I was 
going to sell someone a bag of heroin, [and] not know how 
their body would react to it, that it was my responsibility to 
save a life.”91 Multiple studies have found that some sellers 
occasionally assist people suffering severe withdrawal who 
cannot afford to buy drugs for themselves, offering them a 
small amount of a drug for low or no cost to reduce their risk 
of health complications.92 
Online drug markets have opened up new possibilities for 
people who sell drugs to be involved in harm reduction. They 
provide much more opportunity than in-person markets 
for sellers and their customers to exchange information on 
products and their potency, allowing people to make more 
informed decisions about their purchases. T-chka, an online 
drug market primarily serving European customers, explicitly 
forbids the sale of “research-chemical-type drugs that have a 
short history of human consumption,” in an effort to reduce 
their clients’ exposure to particularly high risk or untested 
products. Other online markets have begun selling naloxone, 
which some people have difficulty accessing legally in their 
communities. In 2016 the AlphaBay marketplace waived the 
usual vendor fee for anyone distributing naloxone, in an effort 
to facilitate access.93
If drug checking equipment were made widely available, 
people who sell drugs might be enlisted to help provide 
these services, allowing people to get a more accurate sense 
of drug potency and to make better-informed decisions 
about dosing. One qualitative study of people who use drugs 
(some of whom had also been involved in drug selling) in 
Vancouver, Canada suggested that, although some people 
who sell drugs are interested in getting involved in drug 
checking, criminalization presents a huge barrier. One 
person interviewed commented that, “the time I dealt dope, 
I would’ve used that [drug checking] machine every single 
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day.” Another speculated that the person from whom she 
bought drugs would also be interested in participating in drug 
checking, “because a lot of dealers do care about their product 
and what they’re selling. […] If they tell a customer this is 
whatever it is, then they know they’re not lying. They know 
they’re not [screwing] people over […]. They’re going to have 
better business.” 
However, the participants in this study also identified that, 
under the current system of criminalization, sellers are actively 
discouraged from engaging in drug checking. One study 
participant commented, “I don’t think they’d go into some 
government building, take out all their dope, and then put 
it on [the drug checking machine].”94 Drug checking also 
has the potential to put people who sell drugs at greater risk 
of prosecution for drug-induced homicide, since knowing 
the composition of their drugs could increase their perceived 
liability if their customers overdose.95 
Myth 2: Policymakers can reduce violent crime 
with harsh penalties for those who sell or 
distribute drugs.
Policymakers have long justified harsh penalties for those 
who sell or distribute drugs by arguing that this approach will 
reduce violent crime. However, evidence suggests that law 
enforcement crackdowns on drug market activity may actually 
increase violent crime. In addition, while some drug markets 
do involve violence, others do not: many operate more or less 
nonviolently. Treating all drug selling- and distribution-related 
activity as if it is inherently linked to violence does not reflect 
the diverse reality of drug markets and the people who work 
in them.
Fact: Drug prohibition itself may be driving 
drug market violence.
The prohibition of drugs enhances their profitability – 
hundred-fold price increases from production to sale are 
common96 – and creates significant financial incentives for 
large criminal organizations to enter the illegal market.97 
These organizations vie for market share ungoverned by the 
institutions that organize and regulate legal markets. Absent 
regulation or legal mechanisms for conflict resolution, 
violence and intimidation sometimes serve as means to assert 
control, grow in size and power, or settle disputes.98 
It is not the drugs themselves that cause violence, but rather 
the exclusion of those who sell and distribute drugs from 
the kinds of property protections and dispute resolution 
mechanisms available to those who operate legal businesses.99 
In addition, people selling illegal drugs are far more likely to 
have large amounts of cash than legal entrepreneurs who have 
more options for cashless transactions, making sellers easier 
targets for theft.100
Efforts to decrease penalties for people who use, sell or 
distribute drugs are important steps toward reducing 
the harms of criminalization. But  to tackle the violence, 
corruption and human rights abuses associated with some 
parts of the illegal drug market, a more broad conversation 
about the legal regulation of drugs is necessary.  (See text box 
on page 9.)
Fact: The policing of drug selling- and 
distribution-related activity may be increasing 
drug market-related violence.
A 2011 systematic review of the effect of drug law 
enforcement on drug market violence reported that 91% of 
examined studies found that an increase in the intensity of 
enforcement was associated with an increase in drug market 
violence. Its authors concluded that, 
contrary to the 
conventional wisdom 
that increasing drug law 
enforcement will reduce 
violence, the existing 
scientific evidence 
base suggests that 
drug prohibition likely 





and the Overdose Crisis
As overdose rates continue to rise, policymakers in many jurisdictions have responded by harshly punishing those who sell 
or distribute drugs. One of the most egregious manifestations of this trend is the practice of charging a person who supplies 
the drugs involved in an overdose death with murder, or “drug-induced homicide.” As of 2019, 20 states had statutes that 
create specific criminal penalties for the delivery of an illegal drug when the recipient dies as a result of ingesting the 
substance.  State penalties vary from two years to capital punishment, while six states – Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island and West Virginia – set the minimum penalty as life in prison. The federal law includes a penalty of 
20 years to life.
Drug-induced homicide prosecutions increased dramatically between 2011 and 2016. Although data on the precise number 
of people being prosecuted under these laws are unavailable, DPA’s 2017 report An Overdose Death Is Not Murder: Why 
Drug-Induced Homicide Laws Are Counterproductive and Inhumane tracks media mentions of drug-induced homicide 
prosecutions as a proxy for actual prosecutions. In 2011, there were 363 news articles about individuals being prosecuted 
for drug-induced homicide; in 2016 there were 1,178, an increase of over 300%.  
New drug-induced homicide laws are being created and existing penalties are being made more severe: in 2017 alone, 
legislators in Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia all introduced bills to create or increase penalties for drug-induced homicide. 
One federal proposal would have allowed prosecutors to seek the death penalty for drug sellers linked to an overdose death 
in some cases. 
One factor driving the increase in overdose deaths is the introduction of fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opioid, into the 
U.S. drug supply. Often sold mixed into substances marketed as heroin, fentanyl – like any other additive that makes drug 
potency unpredictable – makes it challenging for someone to dose themselves safely. Policymakers routinely assume that 
people who sell products containing fentanyl (but do not market them as such) are aware of what they are selling and are 
purposefully misrepresenting their product to buyers. Available evidence, however, suggests that many street-level sellers 
do not know that the product they are distributing contains fentanyl.U.S. Sentencing Commission data show that of the 51 
people convicted of a fentanyl-related offense under federal law in 2016, only 15% “clearly knew” they were distributing or 
selling fentanyl. In some areas, fentanyl has infiltrated the market to such a degree that it is present in virtually the entire 
heroin supply, meaning that people who sell drugs do not have other options, even if they had a way of measuring product 
content themselves. 
Compounding the irrationality of drug-induced homicide charges, An Overdose Death Is Not Murder chronicles how recent 
prosecutions have targeted fellow drug users and friends of the person who died of an overdose, not high-level suppliers. It 
tells the story of Samantha Molkenthen, sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in Wisconsin for providing the heroin that was 
involved in her friend Dale Bjorklund’s overdose death; the two routinely shared drugs and used together. The report also 
profiles Erik Scott Brown, a 27-year-old currently serving a 23 year sentence in federal prison for supplying his friend Steven 
Keith Scott with 0.1g of heroin.  The two were partying together, and Brown traded the heroin to Scott in exchange for 0.25g 
of a synthetic cathinone (colloquially known as “bath salts”).  Jennifer Marie Johnson is serving six years for the overdose 
death of her husband, Denis Parmuat. After a night of drinking, Parmuat asked Johnson for some of her methadone 
prescription to help him fall asleep. She gave him some, and he took more without asking. When Parmuat started breathing 
strangely, Johnson called 911 immediately and tried to revive him while they were waiting for help, but he died anyway. She 
was eventually found guilty of third-degree murder. 
Drug-induced homicide prosecutions unjustly intensify the criminalization of low-level sellers and sharers of drugs, sending 
them to prison while still grieving their deceased loved ones. This approach perpetuates the idea that sellers cause people 
to use drugs and are responsible for associated consequences. It also reinforces the myth that supply-side enforcement will 
reduce drug use, while discouraging people from calling for help at the scene of an overdose. Drug-induced homicide laws 
allow policymakers and law enforcement to feel like they are making a difference, when in reality they are doing nothing at 
all to keep people who use drugs safe.
For the full report and citation list, visit drugpolicy.org/DIH.
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Criminologist Scott Jacques agrees, arguing that “police 
pressure [results in outcomes that] serve to increase the 
prevalence of predatory and retaliatory acts.”102
A number of dynamics may be contributing to this increase 
in violence. Jacques observes that “real dealers” – those who 
sell high-quality drugs of reliable potency and composition – 
are more vulnerable to law enforcement arrest, because they 
generally control more significant market share than those 
with inferior products. But when these people are arrested, 
“fake dealers” – those who sell misrepresented, adulterated or 
counterfeit products – take advantage of their absence to sell 
to people looking for a new source. A higher proportion of 
fraudulent sales increases the likelihood of retaliatory violence 
in a market.103 
Jacques also suggests that during periods of intense policing 
of drug markets, people are more likely to rush exchanges to 
avoid detection. But rushing through exchanges means that 
buyers do not have time to check that they are getting the 
substance they paid for in the quantity that they are expecting, 
while sellers have less time to confirm that they are receiving 
appropriate payment and not being given counterfeit money. 
Rushed transactions provide additional opportunities for 
fraud, again potentially increasing violence.104
The prevalence of police use of confidential informants is also 
a potential contributor to drug market violence. Jacques points 
to the fact that law enforcement frequently enlist confidential 
informants to assist them in policing drug markets – typically 
individuals who are involved in the drug economy and agree 
to provide information to the police, often as part of a plea 
agreement or in exchange for cash or other benefits. People 
who sell drugs and wish to avoid arrest have a strong interest 
in preventing such ‘snitching,’ and may retaliate against those 
who are suspected of working with the police.105 
Other researchers have suggested additional dynamics that 
may be contributing to increases in drug market violence 
associated with police intervention. Markets in which there 
are strong interpersonal relationships between people who sell 
or distribute drugs tend to be less volatile: these relationships 
facilitate the management of competition and the nonviolent 
resolution of disagreements. But when these people are 
arrested by law enforcement, their roles are taken over by 
new actors. These new individuals may lack the effective and 
stable working relationships of their predecessors, at least at 
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first, which may lead to more confrontations.106 Competition 
among remaining suppliers to take over newly-vacated market 
share may also increase instability and conflict.107 
As law enforcement crackdowns make a particular drug 
market a more volatile and high-risk work environment, sellers 
and distributors who are more risk averse and consequently 
had a stabilizing effect on the market may choose to leave it.108 
Historian of organized crime Michael Woodiwiss observes, 
“If increased drug law enforcement has done anything 
over the past two decades it has been to create competitive 
advantage for criminal groups with skills, connections and 
capital to nullify enforcement with corruption and the 
firepower to resist theft and takeover bids.”109 Increased law 
enforcement pressure on drug markets results in smaller, less 
sophisticated, less militant drug supply networks being driven 
out of operation, while more sophisticated and powerful 
organizations with more capacity to use force are often able to 
avoid disruption and increase their market share.110
In addition to increasing violence within the drug market, law 
enforcement activity in a particular area may itself generate 
violence for community members. Harsh enforcement of laws 
against low-level drug market activity may also contribute to 
community distrust of the police. Sociologists Waverly Duck 
and Anne Rawls observed in a neighborhood drug market 
they examined that, “for many residents police intervention 
is an intrusion that creates chaos and danger – not a source of 
order and protection.”111 
Fact: Drug markets are much more diverse 
than the stereotypes about them suggest.
The relationship between drug markets and violence is 
complicated, and in some contexts it is clear that drug 
prohibition has fueled organized crime and been associated 
with horrific violence and corruption. In Mexico, for instance, 
around 200,000 people have been murdered and over 28,000 
reported as disappeared since 2007, around the time that 
former President Felipe Calderón launched a militarized 
offensive against drug trafficking organizations.112 While 
security forces themselves have perpetuated widespread abuses, 
drug trafficking groups are also responsible for serious crimes, 
including killings, disappearances and kidnappings.113
In the domestic context, open air drug markets in high 
crime neighborhoods dominate both policy discourse and 
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popular culture. In reality, however, these markets represent 
a small fraction of the overall drug economy. Many people 
procure drugs from people they know – in private homes, 
dorm rooms or offices – rather than from strangers on street 
corners.114 Nonviolent networks of middle class people who 
sell and distribute drugs, sociologists A. Rafik Mohamed and 
Erik D. Fritzvold argue, constitute “the silent majority of US 
drug dealers.”115 
Criminologists Scott Jacques and Richard Wright note that 
violence is not an 
invariant or inevitable 
feature of drug markets; 
many such markets 
experience little or no 
serious violence, and 
even the most violent 
drug markets are 
peaceful most of the 
time.”116 
Public policy scholars Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter Reuter 
agree, concluding “there is no necessary relationship between 
the quantity of drugs delivered and the amount of market-
related harm generated.”117 
A 2011 spatial analysis of drug market activity and violence 
in Seattle found “places […] with high levels of drug activity 
but very little violence, places with high levels of violence 
but without drug activity and places where drug incidents 
and violent crimes overlapped,” suggesting that drug-related 
activity was not the primary driver of violence in Seattle.118 
Few researchers have made this kind of attempt to determine 
whether or not drug market activity can be isolated as the 
sole or primary driver of violence in a particular area.119 Some 
hypothesize that many areas with both high rates of drug 
activity and high rates of violent crime would experience fairly 
high crime rates even absent drug market activity.120
Drug markets differ from one another in a wide variety of 
other ways generally ignored by researchers and policymakers. 
Some drug markets are run by large organizations, while 
others are dominated by much smaller, local groups or 
individuals.121 In some areas, people who sell or distribute 
drugs and their customers live in the neighborhood where 
they work and/or buy drugs, while in other places some or all 
of these actors commute to engage in the drug market.122 
Supply-side drug activity has always been diverse, but in 
recent years new technologies have enabled even more 
variation. The rise of online drug marketplaces has expanded 
the range of buyers who have alternatives to public 
transactions,123 while the ubiquity of cell phones has made it 
easier for buyers and sellers to meet more discreetly.124 
Even networks of sellers and buyers commonly considered to 
be a single drug market may in fact be a set of overlapping 
drug markets that intersect to varying degrees. In a single 
geographical area, for example, a network of youth who sell 
and distribute locally grown marijuana primarily to other 
youth may operate virtually independently of – and share 
few characteristics with – other parts of the market.125 The 
need for more nuanced exploration of variation among drug 
markets is discussed further on p. 53.
Fact: Violence is not an inherent feature of 
drug market activity. In areas where drug 
market activity does drive violence, it is 
more likely an effect of prohibition and 
characteristics of particular markets, not of 
drug selling itself.
When people who work on the supply side of the drug 
economy are involved in threats, coercion or conduct that 
causes physical harm to another person, these people should 
be held accountable for their actions. But assuming an 
inherent connection between people involved in drug selling 
or distribution and violence, and criminalizing all people 
involved in drug selling as if they are inherently dangerous 
people, is both inappropriate and ineffective. 
When policymakers assume an inherent connection between 
people involved in drug selling or distribution and violence, 
three negative outcomes result. First, we end up with a system 
that criminalizes people for nonviolent supply-side drug 
“
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market activity to a degree that is disproportionate to the 
harm that they actually caused. Second, we are far less likely 
to ask meaningful questions about the factors that actually 
do drive violence in communities. Finally, it distracts us from 
the questions that should be central to effective policymaking: 
why do some drug markets operate nonviolently while others 
are more volatile, and how can policymakers guide volatile 
markets to take more stable forms?126 
A few scholars have speculated about the specific 
characteristics of drug markets that may influence their 
relationship to violence, including: the proximity of the 
market to international borders,127 gang dynamics (or lack 
thereof ) within the distribution network,128 the age of the 
participants,129 whether drugs are typically being transported 
in bulk or in smaller amounts,130 the size of the community 
where drug selling is taking place,131 the value by volume 
of the drugs being sold, the intensity of law enforcement, 
whether buyers and sellers come from the area where they 
are selling or whether they travel from elsewhere to conduct 
transactions,132 the availability of weapons, and the overall 
stability of the market.133 Advocates and policymakers need 
to encourage more comparative research on drug markets to 
tease out the role of each of these factors.
Some hypothesize that the emergence of new technologies 
such as cell phones and online platforms for drug transactions 
have reduced the prevalence of drug market-related violence 
by making transactions more predictable and less reliant on 
foot traffic.134 Without the need to control territory to make 
sales, drug suppliers find it less necessary to physically defend 
their turf to maintain market share. Testing such hypotheses 
is a crucial step toward more effective violence-reduction 
policies, discussed further on p. 52.
Fact: Researchers have understudied 
nonviolent drug markets, which has led to 
significant gaps in the academic literature.
Researchers have tended to focus most of their attention on 
drug markets that are associated with violence. They tend 
to study drug markets that they already know to operate in 
violent areas, without making enough effort to seek out less 
violent drug markets for examination.135 They also tend to 
focus on the drug markets that are easiest for outsiders to 
locate: those that take place outdoors, where buyers and sellers 
don’t know each other outside of the sales relationship, and 
that attract a lot of attention from the police and the media. 
Scholars who are not directly involved with drug market 
activity themselves have difficulty gaining access to more 
discreet supply chains. This leaves significant portions of the 
supply side of the drug economy dramatically under-studied. 
Law enforcement attention is also most likely to be directed 
at areas where drug market activity and violence overlap. This 
leads to a disproportionate number of arrested sellers and 
distributors coming from these areas, making data about these 
markets (via law enforcement) more available to researchers. 
But this can leave researchers, along with members of the 
public, with the mistaken impression that the majority of 
sellers and distributors operate in these markets.136 The impact 
of research bias on current conversations about those who 
sell and distribute – and the need to address it – is discussed 
further on p. 53-54. 
Myth 3: Most of the people who end up 
serving long prison sentences for drug 
selling- and distribution-related offenses 
are high-level suppliers who are violent and 
getting rich off the illegal drug market.
Policymakers justify harsh sentences for selling- and 
distribution-related law violations by saying that those who 
receive these penalties are high-level suppliers or kingpins.137 
In 2009, however, only 41.4% of people incarcerated in 
federal prison for drug law violations138 (99.5% of whom were 
serving sentences for selling- or distribution-related offenses139) 
were involved with the organization and management of a 
drug supply network in any way, even as mid-level managers. 
A mere 14% were considered importers, high-level suppliers, 
organizers or leaders.140 The remaining 58.6% were a mixture 
of: low-level sellers who distributed retail quantities of a drug 
directly to people who use drugs; brokers, steerers and go-
betweens who directed potential buyers to potential sellers; 
couriers and mules who transported drugs from one place 
to another; and “secondary” and “miscellaneous” people, 
including lookouts and bodyguards.141,142 
The available federal data also suggest that many of those in 
prison for distribution-related offenses had little criminal 
history or record of violent conduct. Thirty-eight percent of 
those convicted of a federal drug offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum penalty in 2016 had no criminal history; an 
additional 8%143 had never been sentenced to a prison term 
of longer than sixty days or any “crime of violence”.144 Most 
people in prison for a selling- or distribution-related offense 
are not locked up for an offense that caused anyone physical 
harm,145 while 76% of people in federal prison for a drug 
law violation in 2012 had no weapon involved in their most 
recent offense.146, 147 
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“Offender Function” According to the 
United States Sentencing Commission
The U.S. Sentencing Commission divides those 
convicted of federal drug trafficking into ten 
categories based on “offender function”: the role that 
a person played in a drug operation. The Sentencing 
Commission’s designation defines “importers and 
high level suppliers” as having engaged in the most 
serious conduct and “employees and workers” in 
the most minor conduct. The full range of offense 
categories are explained in detail below, in order 
of decreasing “culpability”(definitions are quoted 
verbatim from the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 
2017 report Mandatory Minimum Penalties for 
Federal Drug Offenders). While the Drug Policy 
Alliance does not endorse this typology, it is the only 
one currently used to report statistics on what kind of 
sellers and distributors are actually in federal prison.
  Importer/High Level Supplier: Someone who 
imports or otherwise supplies large quantities of drugs 
(generally sells/possesses or purchases 1 kilogram 
or more in a single transaction); is near the top of the 
distribution chain; has ownership interest in drugs; 
usually supplies drugs to other drug distributors and 
generally does not deal in retail amounts; may employ 
no or very few subordinates.
  Organizer or Leader: Organizes, leads, directs, or 
otherwise runs a drug distribution organization; has 
the largest share of the profits and the most decision-
making authority.
  Grower or Manufacturer: Grows, cultivates, or 
manufactures a controlled substance and is the 
principal owner of the drugs.
  Wholesaler: Sells more than retail/user-level quantities 
in a single transaction; sells at least 1 ounce (28 
grams) but less than 1 kilogram at one time; possesses 
or buys at least 2 ounces (56 grams) at one time, sells 
any amount to another dealer.
  Manager or Supervisor: Serves as a lieutenant to 
assist one of the above; manages all or a significant 
portion of a drug manufacturing, importation, or 
distribution operation; takes instructions from one of 
the above and conveys to subordinates; supervises 
directly at least one other co-participant in an 
organization of at least five co-participants.
  Street-Level Dealer: Distributes retail quantities 
directly to the user; sells less than 1 ounce (28 grams) 
quantities to any user(s).
  Broker: Arranges for two parties to buy/sell drugs, or 
directs potential buyer to a potential seller.
  Courier: Transports or carriers drugs with the 
assistance of a vehicle or other equipment. Includes 
situations where the offender, who is otherwise 
considered to be a crew member, is the only 
participant directing a vessel onto which the drugs 
had been loaded from a ‘mother-ship.’
  Mule: Transports or carriers drugs internally or on 
their person, often by airplane, or by walking across a 
border. Also, includes an offender who only transports 
or carries drugs in baggage, souvenirs, clothing, 
otherwise.
  Employee/Worker: Performs very limited, low-level 
function in the offense (whether or not ongoing); 
includes running errands, answering the telephone, 
scouts, receiving packages, packaging the drugs, 
manual labor, acting as a lookout to provide early 
warnings (during meetings, exchanges, or on/
offloading), passengers in vehicles, or acting as a 
deckhand/crew member on vessel or aircraft used to 
transport large quantities of drugs.
Percentage of People in Federal Prison Convicted of an 
Offense Carrying a Mandatory Minimum Sentence (by Role) 




































The full report, Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Drug 
Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System, can be 
found on the U.S. Sentencing Commission website.
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Mandatory minimum sentences are particularly hard on 
those at or near the bottom of drug supplying hierarchies. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has acknowledged that 
“while some legislative history suggests that drug mandatory 
minimums were aimed at ‘serious’ and ‘major’ traffickers, the 
data indicate the mandatory minimum penalties apply more 
broadly.”148 Almost half of people sentenced for trafficking 
and distribution offenses at the federal level in 2016 (the most 
recent year for which data are available) were sentenced for 
offenses carrying mandatory minimum sentences.149 Fifty-five 
percent of these individuals fell into the lowest five of the 
Sentencing Commission’s categories for drug trafficking law 
violations: they were street-level dealers, brokers, couriers, 
‘mules’, employees and workers –  not kingpins.150 As depicted 
in the graph on p. 21, one in two brokers and one in two 
employees/workers (defined by the Sentencing Commission 
as those who “perform very limited, low-level functions 
in the offense”) were subjected to mandatory minimums 
despite their minimal roles. In addition, one in three street-
level dealers, one in three couriers, and one in four mules 
were convicted of offenses carrying a mandatory minimum 
sentence.  A mere 4.2% of those sent to federal prison for 
drug offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in 2016 
were convicted of conduct that resulted in bodily injury.151 
Myth 4: The current system of supply-side drug 
market criminalization is race-neutral. The 
majority of people in prison for drug selling- 
or distribution-related conduct are people of 
color because sellers and distributors come 
mostly from these communities.
Since the early days of drug prohibition in the U.S., the 
criminalization of drug selling and distribution has been 
intimately tied to the criminalization of communities of color. 
While the discriminatory impact of the current system is 
well-documented (see p. 36, for example), the racism baked 
into the system from the beginning is less widely understood. 
There are clear continuities between the racist, classist and 
xenophobic attitudes that motivated drug prohibition in the 
first place and the dominant policy approaches to those who 
sell or distribute drugs today. These early stereotypes cast a 
long shadow, laying the groundwork for our current system of 
supply-side criminalization.
Four Common Myths about Drug 
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Fact: White people are slightly more likely 
than people of color to report having sold 
drugs. 
Data on the demographics of people who sell and distribute 
drugs are scarce, and it is safe to assume that involvement in 
the illegal drug trade is under-reported due to stigma and fear 
of criminal prosecution. What data are available, however, 
suggest that white people are actually more likely than either 
Black or Latinx people to report having sold drugs.152
SAMHSA’s 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 
which published the most recent data available, found that 
3.4% of white people, 2.9% of Black people, 2.8% of Latinx 
people, 4.2% of people who identified as Native American 
or Alaskan Native, 3.5% of those who identified as Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and 1.1% of people who 
identified as Asian reported selling drugs in the past year.153 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which 
collected data between 1997 and 2005, found that 11.9% of 
white youth ages 15-17 reported having sold drugs compared 
to only 6.6% of Black youth,154 a finding echoed by several 
older youth-focused surveys.155 The NLSY also found that 
the average white youth drug seller earned more money from 
selling drugs than either Latinx or Black youth, with Black 
youth earning the least.156 
While evidence for significant racial disparities among people 
who sell and distribute drugs is lacking, there is clear evidence 
of massive racial disparities in who is searched, arrested, 
convicted and imprisoned for drug selling and distribution.
Fact: In the early days of the drug war, people 
of color were perceived to be providing drugs 
to white people as part of a plot to usurp 
control of white society.
One of the United States’ first anti-drug laws was passed in 
San Francisco in 1875 and made it a crime to operate a so-
called “opium den.” White Californians closely associated 
these establishments with Chinese immigrants. Fear of 
Chinese people selling opium to white people, especially 
to white women, was one component of the rampant anti-
Chinese sentiment of the time.157 The rhetoric of opium use 
as a spreading disease intersected with a broader narrative 
of Chinese immigration as the “yellow peril.” In an 1887 
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publication on addiction, a medical doctor reported on a case 
in which he alleged a white woman who had taken opium 
literally turned “yellow” as a result of the Chinese influence.158 
White society, people believed, was falling prey to the 
“stupefying pipe of the Oriental.”159 White people were 
convinced that Chinese immigrants were using opium to 
gain power over them, and early approaches to controlling 
the opium economy were grounded in this belief. Journalist 
Johann Hari describes the prevailing attitude of the time: 
“Once the Chinese dealers got you hooked on opiates,” the 
thinking went, “they would laugh in your face and reveal the 
real reason they sell junk: it was their way of making sure that 
‘the yellow race would rule the world.’” Hari quotes a senior 
judge of the time who declared that the Chinese community 
was “too wise […] to attempt to win in battle, but they would 
win by wits; would strike at the white race through dope 
and when the time was ripe would command the world.”160 
Positioning Chinese immigrants as drug sellers and scheming 
predators was consistent with pre-existing racist stereotypes. It 
also legitimized policies aimed at oppressing and maintaining 
control over the Chinese-American community and led 
directly to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 
1882.161
The Chinese-American community was not the only 
community of color demonized through the specter of drug 
distribution. Harry Anslinger, the first Commissioner of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and a leading figure in the 
early days of the American drug war, claimed that Black and 
Puerto Rican “dope pushers” were seducing “pretty blond 
girls” into using drugs and engaging in sex work.162 According 
to Anslinger, Mexican pushers and Black dealers from the 
inner city were “invading” white suburbs to force marijuana 
and heroin on white teenagers.163 These racialized predators, 
white people assumed, were the only reason that drug use 
existed in suburban white communities at all.164 This narrative 
simultaneously justified harsh laws targeting people who sell 
and distribute drugs and legitimized the criminalization of 
communities of color.165 
Fact: Racist assumptions about who sells 
drugs – and to whom – continued to underpin 
discourse about supply-side drug market 
activity throughout the 20th century and into 
the 21st.
Late 20th century rhetoric about those who sell and distribute 
drugs bore a striking resemblance to that of the 19th century. 
Historian Julilly Kohler-Hausmann notes:
[drugs] were presented as indigenous to inner cities; 
if they did appear in other communities, they were 
imagined as a weed or disease that had escaped from its 
traditional ecosystem to infect new territory. […] [This 
narrative] located the genesis of social problems in urban 
communities of color and deflected attention from other 
social, economic, and cultural factors that could inspire 
young white people to use drugs.166 
When President Richard Nixon formally launched the war on 
drugs in 1971, Time magazine explained that “once confined 
to black urban ghettos,” drug use had “come to invade the 
heartland of white, middle-class America.”167 Almost 20 years 
later, a 1989 New York Times Magazine article recycled this 
sentiment when it described crack cocaine as having “leaped 
across the city lines into the middle-class suburbs” as Black 
traffickers “invaded the heartland.”168 
Also in 1989, an HBO documentary about Palm Beach 
County, Florida, juxtaposed footage of a Black male drug 
seller boasting about the “money in the drug game” with two 
white fifteen year old girls guiltily discussing their recovery 
from cocaine addiction in a private treatment facility.169  
In the 1990s a Dateline NBC special positioned heroin as an 
“inner city drug” that “has jumped the tracks and has been 
killing kids in some of our most prosperous suburbs.”170 Just 
as they had been at the turn of the century, people of color 
from urban neighborhoods were assumed to be travelling to 
white suburbs to push drugs on white suburbanites.171 
As was the case in San Francisco in the late 1800s, 
policymakers today – either consciously or unconsciously 
– entwine rhetoric about people who sell drugs with racist 
tropes that go back over a century. Anxiety about white people 
using drugs remains bound up with the idea that these drugs 
are coming from racialized “others,” and this anxiety can still 
be mobilized in support of harsh policies criminalizing people 
involved in drug selling or distribution.
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Caswick Naverro’s Story
“Ever since the age of 13, I’ve 
been taking care of people.”
Growing up in New Orleans wasn’t easy for 
Caswick Naverro. His neighborhood was rife 
with gang activity and homicides were common. 
From a young age, he remembers people dying 
all around him. “A lot of friends of mine from the 
neighborhood were getting killed, and – you know, 
people from school were getting killed,” he says. 
He began experiencing post-traumatic stress 
disorder symptoms early in life. When his 
grandmother died, he couldn’t take it anymore. 
“That was around the time I started using 
marijuana and codeine,” Naverro remembers. “And 
when I smoked it or whatever it just made me 
forget about what was going on, like I didn’t have 
no feelings towards it, no – I kind of felt normal for 
a second.”
Naverro never met his father. His mother had 
lupus and struggled to provide food and housing 
for her and her five kids. They moved around 
all the time, crashing at other people’s homes, 
sometimes for weeks or months at a time. Naverro 
started selling drugs when he was 13 years old to 
help support his mother and siblings. 
He describes how being able to contribute to his 
family gave him a sense of pride and stability in 
his otherwise chaotic life: “Ever since the age of 
13, I’ve been taking care of people. I always had 
my mom and my two other younger siblings I had 
to take care of, so I’ve been selling drugs since 13. 
I always fell in love with being that big provider. 
You know, I loved it.” 
Eventually, he was arrested and sent to juvenile 
detention. When he got out, he was determined 
to leave drug selling behind and provide for his 
family through legal employment. “So I filled 
out all of these jobs, at McDonald’s, Burger 
King, Walmart, and nobody ever called me back,” 
Naverro remembers. “I am still waiting on people 
to call me back from applications I filled out. I 
never had no — no job like that because nobody 
wants to hire no convicted felon, you know?”
With no other options, Naverro returned to selling 
and using drugs, particularly methamphetamine, 
marijuana and codeine. By his junior year of 
high school, his PTSD symptoms had become so 
intense that he wasn’t sleeping. He overdosed on 
over-the-counter cold medicine while at school 
and spent time in an inpatient mental health facility. 
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In his senior year he was shot in the side while 
picking up diapers at a gas station, leading to 
ongoing physical pain and worsening nightmares. 
In the fall of 2016, Naverro was pulled over 
by the police for a broken taillight. The police 
searched him and found 91 methamphetamine 
pills in his pant leg and a gun that was registered 
to his girlfriend. At the time of his arrest, he 
explained, “I was using […] every day. I never 
— I don’t recall not using it one day.” He was 
charged with possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine and illegal gun possession.
Naverro agreed to participate in a treatment 
program administered by the court, instead of 
going to prison. While he avoided incarceration, 
drug court brought a new set of challenges 
and burdens. He had to stop using drugs and 
struggled with the mental health impact of 
being unable to self-medicate. Through a local 
community program, Naverro was finally able 
to secure a legal job doing sanitation for the 
City of New Orleans, but the drug court program 
requires him to go to drug testing appointments 
at random times during the workday. So far he has 
had understanding supervisors who allow him 
to attend these appointments, but he worries that 
this won’t always be the case. 
For now, he’s glad to have legal work, but fears it 
won’t last. “[I]t was so hard for me to get that job, 
like I was looking for work for years,” he said. The 
job doesn’t pay well, and with two children and 
a girlfriend to support, Naverro still struggles to 
make ends meet. The family is currently living with 
his brother while working to save money to move 
into their own place. Naverro sees how precarious 
their situation is, and worries about being forced 
back into drug selling in the future.
“I don’t want to be no drug dealer the rest of my 
life. I don’t want to be looking over my back 
thinking somebody’s going to rob me or kill me 
over no drugs, you know? I want to go work, wait 
on the paycheck, you know, like everybody else. 
It’s not — when you look at it, it really ain’t even 
worth it, not for drugs, you know what I’m saying? 
But sometimes that’s the only thing people have, 
you know? Because I was in a situation where I 
couldn’t find a job, all I had was drugs.”
Interview conducted October 5, 2018.
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In January 2016, Maine governor Paul LePage blamed Maine’s 
drug-related issues on racialized out-of-state sellers and 
distributors, linking this threat to the sexual purity of white 
women with rhetoric so explicit that Harry Anslinger would 
have been proud: “These traffickers – these aren’t people who 
take drugs,” he said. “These are guys by the name D-Money, 
Smoothie, Shifty. These type of guys that come from 
Connecticut and New York. They come up here, they sell their 
heroin, then they go back home. Incidentally, half the time 
they impregnate a young, white girl before they leave.”172 
President Donald Trump has frequently connected the idea of 
white people using drugs to the threat he perceives as coming 
from people of color, especially immigrants. In January 
2017, on a call with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, 
Trump argued that New Hampshire was a “drug-infested den” 
because of Mexican immigrants “sending drugs to Chicago, 
Los Angeles, and to New York.”173 In 2015, he declared, 
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. 
[…] They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and 
they’re bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bringing 
drugs.”174 Building public support for draconian immigration 
policies and punitive drug policies is made possible by the 
deep cultural embeddedness of the racialized mythology of 
drug selling and distribution.
Four Common Myths about Drug 
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“You’re doing what you have to do.” — Louise Vincent
(Read her story on p. 33)
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How many people are incarcerated for 
drug selling or distribution, and where?
According to the Prison Policy Initiative, there were about 2.1 million people incarcerated in the U.S. in 2019.  
About 20% of these are being held for drug offenses – 6% for possession and 14% for non-possession 
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In 2019, there were roughly 300,000 people 
incarcerated in the United States for non-possession 
drug offenses (including those held both pre- and 
post-conviction) in state and federal prisons, local jails, 
and in the juvenile justice system. Just over half (51%, 
or roughly 153,000 people) were in the state prison 
system. Twenty-seven percent (about 80,000 people) 
were in federal prison, and 22% (about 67,000) were in 
local jails. There were also about 400 people in juvenile 
detention for drug trafficking in 2019 (because this 
number comprised less than 1% of the total it does not 
appear in the chart).
Almost everyone in federal prison for drug offenses was 
there for non-possession offenses, and this roup formed 
just under half of the entire federal prison population.
People incarcerated for drug law violations form a much 
smaller percentage of people in state prison, but of the 
people in state prison for drug offenses, three times 
as many are there for non-possession drug offenses 
compared to possession.
By contrast, a slim minority of th se in local jails for drug 
law violations were there for non-possession offenses, 
although they still formed a significant proportion.
People Incarcerated in Federal Prison 
in the U.S. in 2019
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This is a rough estimate based on the best 
available data. For more information about 
where this data comes from and some of the 
difficulties involved in measuring current prison 
populations in the United States, see www.
prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html. 
Note that our use of these numbers excludes 
those in U.S. Marshals’ custody, Territorial 
Prisons, Immigration Detention, Indian Country 
jails and prisons, military prisons, and those 
held under psychiatric involuntary commitment 
laws, since specific data on those incarcerated 
for non-possession drug offenses in these sites 
is either not applicable or available.
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What Does the Current System of 
Criminalization Look Like?
The current system of selling- and distribution-
related criminalization is deeply flawed. It is arbitrary, 
overbroad and wastes massive amounts of money, 
while doing nothing to reduce – while perhaps even 
exacerbating – the harms it professes to address. 
The current system wastes resources.
Not only does the current system fail to reduce drug addiction 
or community violence, it is also a huge drain on public 
resources. We could be redirecting these resources into health-
focused, harm reduction-oriented, evidence-based approaches 
to drug use, and toward implementing policies that actually 
reduce the harms of drug selling and distribution. In 2017 it 
cost an average of $36,300 to keep someone in federal prison 
for one year;175 in 2015 (the most recent year for which 50-
state data is readily available) it cost an average of $33,274 
at the state level.176 Eight states had a cost per inmate above 
$50,000, up to $69,355 annually per inmate in New York.177 
One estimate suggests that roughly 233,000 people were 
incarcerated for drug selling or distribution offenses at the 
state and federal levels combined in 2019,178 which means 
that the annual price tag of incarceration for supply-side 
drug offenses may be in the neighborhood of $7.5 billion per 
year.179 This excludes the roughly 67,000 people being held in 
local jails for non-possession drug offenses.180 
These figures also do not take into account the cost of 
criminalization before and after someone spends time in 
prison or jail. As one example of these costs, the Hartford 
County Sheriff’s Office (in Maryland, just north of 
Baltimore) has committed to arresting the person who sold 
the drugs involved in every fatal or nonfatal overdose in their 
jurisdiction. In the first 11 months of 2017, this meant 411 
investigations in a county of 250,000 people. Each case, on 
average, took more than 40 hours of police time to investigate 
and cost the Sheriff’s Office between $10,000 and $15,000.181 
Despite the law enforcement resources poured into 
prosecuting low-level sellers, overdoses in Hartford County 
are only going up.  
Police and prosecutors determine who to treat as a 
person who uses drugs and who to treat as a person 
who supplies drugs. 
Police and prosecutors have the power to decide who is a 
drug user and who is a drug seller or distributor in the eyes 
of the criminal justice system. They also have the power to 
determine who the system will treat as a minor player in the 
drug economy and who it will treat as a high-level conspirator. 
And because of the vast gulf between how different drug-
involved people are treated by the system, the stakes of these 
decisions are enormous. At the federal level, for example, 
simple drug possession carries a maximum punishment 
of one year imprisonment, a fine, or both.182 By contrast, 
possession with intent to distribute183 is punishable by up to 
20 years imprisonment – even for very low amounts – with 
the possiblitiy of a life sentence for amounts above certain 
thresholds.184
In states where low-level marijuana possession is punished 
with a civil citation rather than an arrest – or in jurisdictions 
where possession of marijuana is legal – it is the attending 
law enforcement officer who determines whether someone is 
possessing drugs for personal use or whether to arrest them for 
a selling- or distribution-related law violation. In Maryland, 
for example, possession of up to 10 grams of marijuana is 
decriminalized and punishable only with a citation. Yet an 
individual police officer also has the option to arrest someone 
caught with 50 pounds or less of marijuana for possession 
with intent to distribute. This means that an officer could 
arrest an individual with under 10 grams of marijuana for 
possession with intent to distribute since it is an amount that 
is also technically under 50 pounds.185
Once someone is arrested for a drug law violation, the 
prosecutor decides what offense to charge them with. 
Someone could be charged with possession, possession 
with intent to distribute, or with a more serious sales- or 
distribution-related offense, depending on choices made by 
the prosecutor. Prosecutors also decide whether someone 
caught selling a small amount of a drug should be charged 
with the sale of only that amount, or whether they should 
be charged as part of a conspiracy for selling a much larger 
amount (conspiracy charges are discussed further on p. 30). 
This wide discretion gives prosecutors a great deal of 
power over defendants during the plea bargaining process. 
Prosecutors are able to threaten defendants with more serious 
charges if they choose to take their case to court, offering 
relative leniency in exchange for a guilty plea. Prosecutors may 
also use this power to encourage people to share information 
about other individuals’ involvement or to become 
confidential informants.186 
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The impact of these plea bargaining dynamics are especially 
significant because the vast majority of these cases are 
resolved through plea bargaining: in 2016 a mere 2.4% 
of federal trafficking cases went to trial.187 In addition, the 
enormous difference in potential sentence length for those 
charged with mere possession and those charged with selling- 
or distribution-related offenses means that the stakes of 
prosecutorial charging decisions are extremely high.188
The indicia of sale by which police and prosecutors 
make decisions about who is a drug user and who 
is a drug seller or distributor are deeply flawed and 
often subjective. 
Sometimes people are caught in the actual act of transferring 
drugs from one person to another. Many others, however, 
are charged with a selling-related offense after being found in 
possession of a drug. Police and prosecutors make decisions 
about whether the amount of a drug someone possessed 
and the circumstances in which they possessed it are more 
suggestive of possession for distribution or for personal use. 
They make these determinations based on factors called 
‘indicia of sale.’ Drug quantity is the factor most consistently 
used as an indicia of sale: in general, the greater the quantity 
of a drug that someone possesses, the more likely police and 
prosecutors will be to assume that they were involved in 
selling or distribution.
Some jurisdictions’ criminal laws include weight thresholds 
for drug law violations: if an individual is caught with an 
amount of a drug that is greater than the threshold, they 
may be charged with a selling- or distribution-related law 
violation even with no other evidence that they intended to 
sell it. These weight thresholds are generally set with little 
consideration for how people actually purchase and use drugs. 
In Arizona, for example, possessing merely one gram of heroin 
creates a presumption of sales, despite the fact that one gram 
is a fairly typical daily use amount for a regular heroin user.189 
Someone living in a rural area may purchase several weeks’ 
supply of a drug at a time, even if they have no intention 
of reselling it, if they have only sporadic access to a seller. 
Groups of users sometimes purchase bulk quantities of drugs 
to share, hoping to save money and minimize risk by engaging 
collectively in a single transaction.190 
Other jurisdictions such as California and New York do not 
include specific weight thresholds in their statutes, but drug 
weight remains one of the primary factors that police and 
prosecutors use to argue that someone possessed drugs for 
something other than personal use. In these states, individuals 
may be charged with selling- or distribution-related offenses 
for possessing any quantity of an illegal drug.191 
Policymakers and criminal justice system actors generally 
assume that the more of a drug someone possesses, the 
higher up in the distribution hierarchy they are, and thus the 
more deserving of punishment. Many mandatory minimum 
sentences are based on this assumption, tying long sentences 
to drug quantity and eliminating judicial discretion.192 This 
assumption, while central to our current system, is inaccurate. 
Those high up in a drug operation may never actually possess 
drugs themselves, while those who merely transport drugs 
from one place to another are low in the organizational 
hierarchy but face severe penalties because of the quantity 
of drugs that they handle.193 Weight-based sentencing, in 
the words of one former federal prosecutor, “allows law 
enforcement to arrest mules and street dealers and claim 
they are kingpins.”194 Even the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
admitted in a 2011 special report to Congress that the 
“quantity of drugs involved in an offense is not as closely 
related to the offender’s function in the offense as perhaps 
Congress expected.”195 
Prosecutors often use drug weight in conjunction with other 
indicia of sale when building a case against a particular 
individual. Like drug weight, however, many other indicia are 
deeply flawed determinants of whether someone was involved 
in drug selling or distribution. For example, possessing drugs 
that are packaged in separate containers is viewed as an 
indication that someone was selling, despite the fact that it 
is common for people who use drugs to purchase multiple 
baggies at a time for personal use. The possession of scales may 
also be used, although people who use drugs sometimes have 
their own scales to confirm that they are getting as much of a 
drug as they paid for. Having a firearm or carrying cash is also 
a common indicia of sale, even absent any evidence that the 
firearm or the cash was related to drug market activity. 
Aron Tuff, profiled on p. 11, was charged with possession 
with intent to distribute after being found standing near a 
mere 0.3g of cocaine that had been dropped on the ground at 
a party. The police reported that they had seen him making 
“hand motions” and that he had $90 in cash in his pocket at 
the time of his arrest. These allegations were used as indicia of 
sales to support possession with intent to distribute charges, 
despite the fact that 0.3g of cocaine is an amount consistent 
with possession for personal use. 
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What Does the Current System of 
Criminalization Look Like?, cont.
The current system of supply-side drug 
criminalization casts a wide net, capturing a range of 
conduct far beyond many people’s understanding of 
what it means to be a “drug dealer”
Offense categories in the current system are extremely broad. 
Many people whose conduct bears little resemblance to that 
of a traditional “drug dealer” face very harsh sentences. In 
many jurisdictions, someone can be charged with a selling or 
distribution offense any time they transfer ownership of an 
illegal drug to someone else, even if they do not receive any 
money in exchange. This means that a person who shares a 
single dose of a drug with a friend may be prosecuted as a 
distributor.196 In some states, someone who splits drugs into 
separate baggies, changes packaging, or labels containers may 
be charged as a manufacturer, although they had nothing to 
do with actual drug synthesis.197 
Selling and distribution 
laws often capture 
people who run errands, 
answer telephones, 
receive packages, or 
act as lookouts as part 
of drug distribution 
operations, even if 
these roles are very 
casual – for example, 
a roommate or family 
member taking a phone 
message for a person 
involved in a drug 
supply operation.198
Someone can be legally considered in possession of a drug 
even if they do not physically have the drug at all. This is 
referred to as constructive possession. In some states, two 
or more people can also be charged with possession of the 
same drug, referred to as joint possession.199 This means that 
if the police locate drugs in a car with several people in it, 
each person in the car can be charged with constructive joint 
possession with intent to sell as if the drugs were in their 
unique possession, even if they did not have any knowledge of 
the drugs or any role in their distribution.200
Drug conspiracy statutes allow prosecutors to charge very 
minor players in drug supplying networks as if they were 
high-level distributors, often resulting in sentences that are 
vastly disproportionate to the severity of an individual’s 
actual conduct. Conspiracy laws allow prosecutors to charge 
two or more people involved in a supply network with the 
same offense, even if they were not caught taking part in the 
same conduct or playing a similar role.201 These charges were 
designed to be used against high-level distributors who may 
never actually possess drugs themselves.202 But prosecutors 
have often used them instead against people who play minor 
roles in drug supply operations, penalizing them as harshly as 
if they were near the top.203
Corvain Cooper, profiled on p. 42, was charged along with 
fifty other people for conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute 1000 kg of marijuana, along with several other 
offenses related to the financial side of the drug selling 
operation. Cooper was low in the hierarchy and hadn’t made 
much money from his participation, but because of conspiracy 
laws he faced the same penalties as those near the top. Cooper 
received a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
In addition to harsh sentences for low-level sellers and 
distributors, conspiracy charges can lead to even more 
unjust outcomes when used against peripheral actors in drug 
supplying hierarchies who were not at all involved with selling 
or distribution in a meaningful sense. This includes people 
who share an apartment with or take phone messages for those 
more directly involved in the drug economy. 
Crystal Munoz received a 19-year sentence in Texas for 
drawing a map of a road in Big Bend National Park on a 
piece of notebook paper (her sentence was later reduced to 
15 years). She was 25 years old and gave birth to her second 
daughter while incarcerated. Her only prior convictions 
were for misdemeanor drug possession. She drew the map 
for some acquaintances from high school, who used it to 
get around a drug checkpoint while transporting marijuana. 
Her acquaintances were also arrested and testified against 
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her, hoping to lighten their own sentences. Munoz was 
found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute 1000 kg of marijuana, despite the fact that all she 
did was draw the map.204 
Women are especially vulnerable to the perverse effects of 
drug conspiracy laws. This is discussed further on p. 41. 
Many jurisdictions have laws that apply particularly 
harsh penalties to people convicted of certain 
selling- or distribution-related offenses if they 
already have prior convictions, even minor ones. 
Policymakers often treat people with a history of criminal 
justice involvement as the worst of the worst: they are seen 
as dangerous people who refuse to change their behavior.205 
Under federal law, for example, penalties become dramatically 
more severe if someone has one or more prior convictions for 
particular types of offenses, including felony drug offenses. 
Depending on the offense, some mandatory minimum 
penalties jump from ten years to twenty years for a second 
offense, and if someone has two or more prior convictions, 
they could – at least until recently – find themselves facing 
mandatory life imprisonment.206 The First Step Act, passed 
in 2018, reduced the automatic penalty for someone with 
three or more eligible convictions from a life sentence to 25 
years – an improvement over a life sentence, to be sure, but 
still incredibly severe.207 A prior conviction may also make 
someone ineligible for statutory safety valve provisions, which 
allow a court to sentence a person below the mandatory 
minimum in strictly limited circumstances.208 
Many people assume that if someone has multiple felony 
drug offenses on their record, they have participated in 
conduct that is egregious enough to warrant such a harsh 
sentence. For the purpose of the federal statute, however, 
“felony drug offense” is defined extremely broadly. It refers to 
any drug law violation that is punishable by more than one 
year of imprisonment under the law of any jurisdiction,209 
which frequently includes simple possession offenses or other 
offenses considered misdemeanors by the jurisdictions in 
which they occurred. 
About half of U.S. states also have their own laws harshly 
criminalizing people for past convictions.210 While there is 
some variation among states as to which past offenses count, 
the inclusion of drug selling and distribution offenses is 
common. 
Someone convicted 
of a single selling or 
distribution offense  
who has two prior 
convictions for simple 
possession could end 
up in prison for life. 
Aron Tuff, profiled on p. 11, and Corvain Cooper, profiled 
on p. 42, both received life sentences without the possibility 
of parole for alleged low-level selling and distribution-related 
activities on the basis of past convictions. In Tuff’s case, 
his past convictions were all for nonviolent drug offenses 
connected to an addiction that began as an attempt self-
medicate for the pain of a back injury sustained in the Army. 
Cooper’s two prior convictions were both for possession, one 
for marijuana and one for codeine cough syrup.
Criminal history-related sentencing enhancements 
disproportionately impact the members of drug supplying 
hierarchies who are most vulnerable to arrest. As discussed 
further on p.20, these are generally the lowest level sellers and 
distributors, particularly people of color. The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission notes: 
The cumulative sentencing impacts of criminal history 
[…] appear to be particularly acute for Black drug 
offenders. Three-quarters (75.6%) of Black drug offenders 
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
penalty in fiscal year 2010 were excluded from safety valve 
eligibility due to criminal history scores of more than 
one point. […] Only 14.4 percent of Black offenders 
convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum penalty received safety valve relief (either by 
itself or in combination with substantial assistance), 
compared to 48.4 percent of Other Race offenders, 46.3 
percent of Hispanic offenders, and 39.5 percent of White 
offenders.211 
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What Does the Current System of 
Criminalization Look Like?,  cont.
People who are the targets of discriminatory law enforcement 
attention, including those in over-policed communities of 
color, are more likely to circulate through the criminal justice 
system multiple times, while high-level suppliers, white 
suppliers, and others who are more likely to avoid arrest are 
less likely to generate the criminal justice system histories that 
result in the harshest of sentences.212 Both Tuff and Cooper 
are Black.
People who are involved in drug selling and 
distribution may be designated as violent offenders 
even if they never threatened anyone or caused 
anyone physical harm. 
Being categorized as a violent offender by the criminal justice 
system has significant consequences. This group may be 
ineligible for diversion programs and have limited access to 
programming within prison. Upon release, they face much 
greater stigma than other formerly incarcerated people. 
Many people who are not familiar with the criminal justice 
system understandably hear the phrase “violent offender” and 
assume this means someone physically threatened or hurt 
someone. But some states – including South Carolina,213 
Rhode Island214 and Alabama215 – consider drug selling and 
distribution to be inherently violent crimes. The mere act of 
distributing drugs may be considered a “violent crime,” even 
when done nonviolently. 
Other states – such as Arkansas,216 Virginia217 and 
Pennsylvania218 – have laws that categorize someone’s drug 
selling- or distribution-related offense as violent if they 
possessed a weapon, even if that weapon was legally registered 
and was never brandished or used.219 In Arkansas, possessing 
drugs and a firearm at the same time is punishable by 10 to 
40 years or life in prison.220 Pennsylvania’s five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for violation of a drug selling-related 
law while in possession of a firearm specifies that the firearm 
need not have been physically possessed by the defendant: 
it can be in the possession of “the person or the person’s 
accomplice […] or within the actor’s or accomplices reach or 
in close proximity to the controlled substance.”221 This means 
that if someone else possesses a gun during drug selling- or 
distribution-related activity, an individual who never touched 
the gun can be convicted of distribution while in possession 
of a weapon. At the federal level, anyone found guilty of 
possession of a weapon is ineligible for safety valve provisions 
that allow judges to depart from mandatory minimum 
penalties at sentencing.222
In 2004, Weldon Angelos was sentenced to a mandatory 55 
years in prison for selling marijuana while in possession of a 
firearm. Mr. Angelos had received three months of probation 
for a minor charge as a juvenile, but other than that he had 
no history of criminal justice involvement. On three separate 
occasions, he sold eight ounces of marijuana for $350 to a 
confidential informant. The informant testified that he saw 
a gun in Angelos’ possession during two of the transactions, 
once on his person and once in his car, although the 
transactions were conducted peacefully and Mr. Angelos never 
brandished the gun. In his lengthy sentencing decision, Judge 
Paul G. Cassell objected strenuously to the fact that he had no 
choice but to impose such an extreme sentence, writing that 
“the court believes that to sentence Mr. Angelos to prison for 
the rest of his life is unjust, cruel, and even irrational.” Mr. 
Angelos, he went on to point out, faced “a prison term which 
is more than double the sentence of, for example, an aircraft 
hijacker, a terrorist who detonates a bomb in a public place, a 
racist who attacks a minority with the [intention] to kill and 
inflicts permanent or life-threatening injuries, a second-degree 
murderer, or a rapist.” Mr. Angelos was released in 2016 after 
a federal court reduced his sentence.223
Michael Alonzo Thompson received a comparably long 
sentence for selling drugs while in possession of a firearm, 
despite the fact that he was not actually armed at the time of 
the sale. Mr. Thompson sold three pounds of marijuana to an 
acquaintance in Flint, Michigan, who had been pressured to 
participate in the sale by law enforcement. He was arrested 
and the police searched his house, where they found two 
antique guns and a third gun belonging to Thompson’s wife. 
Thompson was found guilty of possession of a weapon during 
the commission of a felony, even though the drugs did not 
actually change hands at his house where the guns were stored, 
and he had no weapons on him at the time of his arrest. 
Since he had prior convictions for other drug offenses, he was 
sentenced to 40 to 60 years in prison.224 
The selling and distribution of some drugs are penalized more 
harshly than others, driven by fear and stereotypes rather than 
any scientific or public health rationale.
Drug selling and distribution are severely criminalized 
regardless of the type of drug, but the particular criminal 
penalties for selling and distribution vary from drug to drug. 
Law enforcement prioritizes arresting people who sell or 
distribute certain drugs, while lawmakers often pass laws that 
include especially harsh sentences for drugs that are perceived 
to be particularly dangerous. 
Louise Vincent’s Story
“I knew [prison] was a 
possibility. But when you’re 
surviving, those aren’t the 
things on your mind. You’re 
doing what you have to do.”
Before Louise Vincent became the woman to see 
for clean syringes or naloxone in Greensboro, 
North Carolina, she had struggled with drug use 
her whole life. She describes how as a youth 
she could not find an effective treatment for her 
bipolar disorder and turned to drugs to self-
medicate. She says she used drugs not to avoid 
her feelings, but to cope with them.
Although many people think that people who use 
and sell drugs fall into two separate categories, in 
reality this line is very blurry. Many people who 
sell drugs, including Vincent, do so to support 
their own drug use. 
“It’s very expensive to use drugs,” Vincent 
explains. “You have to hustle, and everybody that 
uses drugs – who doesn’t have loads of money 
– hustles.” She sold a considerable amount, 
she says, but still had enough money only to 
barely get by day to day. “I knew [prison] was a 
possibility,” she says, “but when you’re surviving, 
those aren’t the things on your mind. You’re doing 
what you have to do.”
In 2003, Vincent was charged with possession 
with intent to sell cocaine. She pled guilty, and – 
unlike many others in the same position – was 
able to go to a residential treatment program in 
lieu of prison time. With support from her family, 
especially her mother, she was able to piece 
things back together and earned a Master’s 
degree in public health.
Then, in 2013, Vincent was hit by a car in a hit 
and run accident. She was in a great deal of 
physical pain, which her doctors were unable to 
manage effectively, and she returned to drugs to 
cope once again. Around this time she became 
involved with the Urban Survivors’ Union, a 
group of people who use drugs who advocate 
for drug policy reform. She became very involved 
in the group and helped found the local chapter 
in Greensboro, North Carolina, which provides 
support to former and active drug users. With 
the help of this new community and medication-
assisted treatment, she was able to stabilize 
her life again. Now, she also works with the 
North Carolina Harm Reduction Coalition, which 
provides syringe exchange and other harm 
reduction interventions.
In the course of her work, Vincent sees the 
potential effectiveness of engaging people who 
sell drugs in reducing the harms of drug use. 
She encourages people who sell drugs to get 
fentanyl test strips and to carry naloxone. She 
also teaches sellers to educate their clients about 
overdose risk and harm reduction. She knows 
that communities of people who use and sell 
drugs are often close knit and overlapping – in 
fact, she believes that someone she bought 
drugs from for many years saved her life when 
her daughter died in 2016. Vincent, stunned and 
grieving, called her former seller for support. 
“I called after my daughter died with no desire 
to go on,” she explained. “He came and sat with 
me. Talked to me about how his mother died. He 
did not sell me drugs this day. His compassion 
in my time of need sticks out to me, especially 
when you hear people talk about how exploitative 
dealers are. He could have easily taken 
advantage of my state of mind, however this is 
not who he was.”  
Despite her devastating loss, Vincent keeps 
going, educating people who use and/or sell 
drugs and running the local syringe exchange. 
She says she can’t imagine doing anything else.
Interview conducted September 20, 2018.
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As discussed earlier on p. 12-16 there is little evidence to 
suggest that harsh criminalization keeps people who use drugs 
or their communities safer, so responding to particularly 
risky drugs with additional police enforcement and severe 
penalties is not an effective way to minimize harm. Police 
and policymakers, moreover, tend to decide what drugs to 
single out based on moral panic and stereotypes, often rooted 
in racism, classism and fear instead of an evidence-based 
assessment of the risks associated with particular drugs. Crack 
cocaine and methamphetamine are two drugs that have been 
singled out for particularly harsh criminalization. 
The disparity in sentences for crack and powder cocaine is 
one of the best known and most egregious examples of the 
criminal justice system singling out a particular drug for 
especially harsh penalties. The two are merely different forms 
of the same drug and produce identical physiological and 
psychotropic effects. The only difference is the speed and 
intensity of their effects due to different methods of ingestion: 
crack cocaine (like powder cocaine that is taken by injection) 
impacts people more rapidly, and its effects are of shorter 
duration compared to powder cocaine ingested nasally. Even 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission now acknowledges that 
lawmakers significantly overstated the difference in their 
effects.225 
Despite these similarities, the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 
and 1988 created mandatory minimum sentences for sale and 
distribution offenses involving crack cocaine that were 100 
times more severe than those for the same offenses involving 
powder cocaine.226 These laws imposed a five-year mandatory 
minimum penalty for trafficking 500 grams of powder cocaine 
and a 10-year mandatory minimum penalty for trafficking 
5000 grams. By contrast, they imposed a five-year mandatory 
minimum for trafficking a mere five grams of crack cocaine 
– the same penalty as 100 times that amount of powder 
cocaine – and a 10-year mandatory minimum for just 50 
grams. This sentencing regime meant that a street-level seller 
of crack cocaine could end up with a far more severe sentence 
than a wholesale supplier of powder cocaine.227 Compounding 
the impact of these disparities, law enforcement often made 
crack arrests and prosecutions a higher priority than powder 
cocaine: crack laws were both harsher and more harshly 
enforced than powder cocaine laws.228 
The National Institute on Drug Abuse’s 1991 National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that 52% of those 
reporting crack cocaine use were white, 38% were Black and 
10% were Latinx.229 Since Black people were significantly 
more likely to use crack cocaine than white people, harsh 
sentencing for crack cocaine effectively became a tool to 
criminalize this community. In 1993, Black people made 
up 88.3% of federal crack cocaine distribution convictions, 
while Latinx people made up 7.1% and white people made 
up only 4.1%.230 The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the 
disparity in crack and powder cocaine sentencing from 100-
to-1 to 18-to-1, a change that was made retroactive as part of 
the 2018 First Step Act – a dramatic improvement, but one 
that fell far short of equalizing the penalties.231
Along with crack cocaine, methamphetamine is among 
the drugs whose sale and distribution are most harshly 
penalized by the current system. Under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, involvement in the sale of between four and five 
grams of pure methamphetamine is treated the same as 22.4 
to 28 grams of crack cocaine, 80 to 100 grams of heroin, or 
400 to 500 grams of powder cocaine.232 In 2017, 36.9% of 
people sentenced for supply-side drug offenses at the federal 
level were involved with methamphetamine, more than any 
other drug by a significant margin.233 Methamphetamine use, 
however, was comparatively low relative to other common 
drugs in 2017: only 0.6% of people in the U.S. reported using 
methamphetamine in the past year, compared to 2.5% for 
crack or powder cocaine, 1.9% for psychedelics, and 15% for 
marijuana.234 
Like crack cocaine, methamphetamine has been the subject 
of several waves of moral panic, which has in turn ensured 
continued support for the exceptionally harsh punishment of 
its sale.235 Law enforcement allocation of significant resources 
to targeting methamphetamine production operations, along 
with the media’s misleading reporting of methamphetamine 
use and sales, played a central role in creating this panic.236
What Does the Current System of 
Criminalization Look Like?, cont.
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While the societal panic about crack cocaine was deeply 
bound up with its association with Black people in urban 
areas, the panic around methamphetamine in the early 2000s 
linked the drug to poor white people in rural areas.237 Social 
scientists have speculated that widespread concern about 
methamphetamine was driven less by its actual dangerousness 
or widespread use and more by white middle and upper class 
fear and revulsion of poor white people. The visibility of poor 
white people led to societal anxieties about the precarity of 
white privilege at a time of worsening economic inequality. 
People using methamphetamine were positioned as not-quite-
fully-white through their association with Black users of crack 
cocaine: the drug was sometimes called “white man’s crack.”238 
Blaming poverty on methamphetamine use and positioning 
it as an irresponsible individual choice provided a convenient 
explanation for white poverty that did not threaten the 
dominant economic or racial orders.239 
Both methamphetamine and crack cocaine use can have 
negative consequences for some people who use them. But 
singling out certain groups of people who sell and distribute 
these drugs (many of whom are also users) for especially harsh 
penalties does nothing to reduce these harms.
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Who is Most Harshly Criminalized 
by Selling and Distribution Laws?
People involved with drug selling and distribution come from 
all segments of society. Sociologist Mike Salinas observes, 
Just as anyone may be an illegal drug user – from 
unemployed homeless ‘junkies’ to students, professors, 
attorneys, lawyers, and dentists – so too can anyone 
become involved in the supply of these drugs, including 
gang members, fast-food workers and shop assistants, 
suburban middle class youth, working professionals, 
affluent college students studying in prestigious 
universities, and legitimate business entrepreneurs.240 
While qualitative research indicates that the demographics 
of people who sell drugs are significantly more diverse than 
stereotypes suggest, quantitative data on who is involved with 
the supply side of the drug economy is sparse and difficult to 
gather. We have a much better idea of who is criminalized for 
drug selling and distribution than who actually supplies drugs. 
Those who are arrested for supply-side drug market activity 
come largely from marginalized communities and have roles at 
the lowest rungs of drug supplying hierarchies. This includes 
people who use drugs, people living with poverty, people of 
color, non-citizens and women.241
People who use drugs
Many people who are criminalized for drug selling and 
distribution also use drugs. Selling drugs is a way to fund 
one’s own drug use, especially for those whose use keeps them 
from maintaining more regular employment, or those who 
are unable to secure legal jobs because of past criminal justice 
system contact, racial discrimination, or other barriers.242 In 
addition, selling drugs provides access to an income stream 
that rises and falls with drug prices, allowing people to 
maintain their use even if drug prices rise.243 Indeed, many 
low-level actors in the supply chain are not paid in money, but 
rather in drugs.244 
A 2004 Bureau of Justice Statistics report found that 70% 
of people incarcerated for drug trafficking in state prison 
reported that they had used drugs in the month prior to 
their offense.245 A 2017 report by the same agency found 
that 29.9% of people in state prison and 28.8% of people 
sentenced to jail for drug offenses between 2007 and 2009 
said their offense was committed to acquire drugs or to 
get money for drugs.246 In 2012, 84% of those arrested for 
distribution offenses in Chicago, 92.9% in New York, 87.8% 
in Sacramento, and 38.1% in Washington, D.C. tested 
positive for drug use.247 The 2012 National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health found that 87.5% of people who reported 
selling drugs in the past year also reported using drugs in 
the past year, while 43.1% of people who said they had sold 
drugs in the past year reported that they met the criteria for a 
substance use disorder.248 
Ohio Democratic gubernatorial candidate Richard Cordray 
stated during his 2018 campaign, “As governor, I will work 
with law enforcement to make sure drug dealers are convicted 
and serve long prison sentences, while people who need 
substance abuse treatment can get it in our communities.”249 
But the fact that so many people who are criminalized for 
drug selling or distribution also use drugs demonstrates that
lawmakers’ push to 
keep people who use 
drugs safe by more 
harshly criminalizing 
sellers is misguided: 
these are often the 
same people.
People who sell or distribute drugs to support their own drug 
use are often more vulnerable to arrest than other suppliers, 
since they frequently play low-level public roles as runners 
or liaise directly with customers (who could be confidential 
informants or undercover police officers).250
People living with poverty
While middle and upper class people are also involved in 
selling drugs, the people most harshly criminalized are 
overwhelmingly poor. This is especially true for people who 
do not have a formal education251: in 2016, 42.9% of those 
sentenced for drug trafficking offenses at the federal level had 
not graduated from high school, while an additional 35.9% 
had graduated from high school but had no post-secondary 
education.252
Low-income people who sell or distribute drugs are also more 
likely than affluent people to conduct their business in public, 
which increases their vulnerability to law enforcement.253 If 
middle- or upper-class drug suppliers are arrested, moreover, 
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they are more likely to post bail and fund their legal defense, 
significantly lessening the consequences of criminal justice 
system involvement. Those with more money and education 
are also better able to pursue income-earning options beyond 
drug supplying, should they choose to do so. “Without the 
encumbrance of a criminal record or time-served in prison,” 
sociologist Mike Salinas observed, “[middle-class drug sellers 
are] free to naturally age out of these […] roles unharmed and 
largely unnoticed.”254 
The disproportionate criminalization of people who live 
with poverty is deeply entwined with the disproportionate 
criminalization of Black and Brown people. People who 
are perceived to be poor – particularly if they are also 
people of color – are more likely to attract law enforcement 
attention or to spend time in areas that are intensely policed 
compared to more affluent people.255 Former New York Police 
Commissioner Lee Brown explained:
In most large cities, the police focus their attention on 
where they see conspicuous drug use – street-corner 
drug sales – and where they get the most complaints. 
Conspicuous drug use is generally in your low-income 
neighborhoods that generally turn out to be your minority 
neighborhoods. . . .It’s easier for police to make an arrest 
when you have people selling drugs on the street corner 
than those who are [selling] in the suburbs or in office 
buildings. The end result is that more blacks are arrested 
than whites because of the relative ease in making those 
arrests.256
Poor people often become involved with selling or distribution 
because they are not able to access adequate economic 
opportunities in the legal economy, whether because of racial 
discrimination, discrimination based on past criminal justice 
system involvement,257 or because of declining or changing 
job opportunities in the communities where they live. In 
his study of people selling crack cocaine in East Harlem, 
anthropologist Philippe Bourgois notes that between 1950 
and 1990 the proportion of factory jobs in New York City 
decreased threefold, in the 1980s the real value of minimum 
wage declined by one-third, and over the same decade the 
federal government’s contribution to New York City’s budget 
decreased by 50%.258 Similar trends have also deeply impacted 
more rural areas of the country: Martinsburg, West Virginia, 
for example, used to be an industrial center full of textile 
plants, and in the 1950s one of its factories alone employed 
three thousand people. By 2004, however, every textile mill 
in town had closed. In 2017, their overdose death rate was 
among the highest in the country.259
While these economic shifts were taking place, political trends 
at both the state and federal levels led to the shrinking of the 
social safety net.260 As government assistance became more 
limited and available to fewer people, many people’s financial 
struggles worsened. Faced with no or only minimum wage 
employment options, people may become involved in drug 
selling and distribution as a way to make ends meet. Journalist 
Tom James argues that drug selling became “a kind of safety 
net,”261 in the absence of one provided by the government. 
Outdoor drug market activity is often misrepresented 
as a cause of urban decline, but it is more appropriately 
understood as an effect of the loss of living wages and the 
dismantling of the social safety net.262 
Caswick Naverro, profiled on p. 24, began using drugs at 
a young age to self-medicate for the post-traumatic stress 
symptoms he was experiencing, a result of growing up in a 
New Orleans neighborhood where violence was common. 
When he was 13, he began selling drugs to help support his 
single mother, who had lupus, and his younger siblings. Now 
23, Naverro has a legal job, but worries about being forced 
back into drug selling if that falls through. “[I]t was so hard 
for me to get that job, like I was looking for work for years,” 
he said. “I don’t want to be no drug dealer the rest of my life. 
I don’t want to be looking over my back thinking somebody’s 
going to rob me or kill me over no drugs, you know? I want to 
go work, wait on the paycheck, you know, like everybody else. 
[…] But sometimes [drug selling is] the only thing people 
have, you know? Because I was in a situation where I couldn’t 
find a job, all I had was drugs.”
A Seattle resident named Terry began selling marijuana 
as a 16-year-old when his mother lost her job. “If I didn’t 
provide money, no one else would,” he said. “I couldn’t just 
wait there and pray that someone would pay the rent.” Terry 
began working as a dishwasher, which became his primary 
source of income. But, paid only $11 per hour, unable to 
get more than part-time hours, and with a child to support, 
he made only about $300 per week. He continues to sell 
drugs on the side, because, as he says, “Unless you’re the 
budgeting king of the world, you’re not going to be able to 
make it on $300 a week.”263 Like Terry, the people selling 
crack cocaine interviewed by Bourgois repeatedly expressed 
frustration about their inability to find steady, dignified, legal 
employment. Many had previously worked in New York City’s 
factories before they shut down and would much rather return 
to union jobs than continue to sell crack.264
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People of color 
As discussed on p. 22 what data are available suggest that 
white people are slightly more likely than people of color to 
report having sold drugs. But people of color are searched, 
arrested, convicted and imprisoned for drug selling and 
distribution at far higher rates than white people. The fact that 
people of color are more likely to be locked up for selling and 
distribution reinforces the racist stereotype that it is mostly 
these communities who are involved in the drug trade.265
In 2012, 78% of people in federal prison for drug offenses 
(99.5% of whom were there for selling and distribution) were 
people of color: 38.8% were Black and 37.2% Latinx,266,267 
although these groups made up only 13% and 18% of the 
total population, respectively.268 In 2016, more than half 
(50.8%) of those sentenced for drug trafficking offenses at 
the federal level were Latinx, while 23.3% were Black, 22.9% 
were white, and 3% were identified as “other.”269 Black people 
were about eight times more likely than white people to be 
arrested for selling or distributing drugs in 1989, and by 2014 
they were still over three times more likely (see Fig. 1).270 
Figure 1. Arrest Rates for Drug Sales and 


























A 2006 study that examined drug markets in Seattle found 
that the majority of those selling most drugs were white.271, 
272 Despite this – and the fact that Seattle was less than 
10% Black at the time – nearly two-thirds (64%) of those 
arrested for drug delivery during the 2.5-year study period 
were Black.273 Examining outdoor arrests at two different 
open-air drug markets, the authors observed discriminatory 
enforcement in both racially mixed and majority white 
areas. In the drug market in a racially mixed area, 38% of 
observed drug transactions involved Black drug sellers and 
39% involved white drug sellers, but 58.6% of those arrested 
for drug delivery in that census track were Black while only 
20.8% were white. In a drug market in a whiter area of the 
city where only 4% of sales involved a Black seller, 32% of 
those arrested for drug delivery were Black.274 
Sociologists A. Rafik Mohamed and Erik D. Fritzvold argue 
that white people are “the silent majority of U.S. drug 
dealers.” The network of white college student sellers whom 
they study constitute the “anti-targets” of criminalization. 
Despite dealing with significant quantities of drugs and 
money while taking few precautions to avoid detection, these 
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Miguel Perez Jr.’s Story
“I served my time. I should go 
back home.”
Miguel Perez Jr. moved to Chicago when he was 
eight years old after his father got a job as a coach 
for the Chicago Sting soccer team. The family 
moved together as legal permanent residents in 
the mid-1980s. 
When Perez was 18 years old he joined the Army. 
He served in Afghanistan with the 2nd Battalion, 
3rd Special Forces Group in 2002 and 2003, and 
was discharged in 2004. After he returned home 
from military service, he began experiencing the 
debilitating symptoms of severe post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). He got sweats, shakes and 
nightmares, and felt constantly overwhelmed with 
anxiety. 
“If I was stuck in traffic,” he says, “I would start 
panicking because somebody is going to hurt 
me, or [I] have this sense somebody is coming 
to get [me].” When there were too many people 
in the grocery store, he felt on high alert as if his 
life was at risk. He couldn’t shake the sense of 
constant threat or danger. Other people seemed 
like enemies.
Desperate for a reprieve, Perez started to use 
alcohol and drugs – which he procured from a 
friend – to cope with the symptoms. By 2006 he 
was using drugs on a daily basis. In 2008, he 
was out with the same friend when he was asked 
to carry a package of two kilograms of cocaine 
across the street and drop it off with another 
person, who turned out to be an undercover police 
officer. Both Perez and his friend were arrested 
and charged with manufacturing and delivering an 
illegal drug. 
Perez was not involved in actually making any 
drugs, but manufacturing charges are used to 
capture a wide variety of conduct that has little to 
do with actual manufacturing. Perez explains, “If 
you grab some drugs and put it inside a bag, that’s 
manufacturing.” Perez pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to seven and a half years in prison.
Mental health support is often hard to access in 
prison. Perez got lucky, however, and did manage 
to access treatment for his PTSD symptoms for 
the first time while incarcerated. “I saw the same 
psychiatrist once a month and a psychologist 
twice a month, plus I had support groups,” he 
said. His symptoms improved with treatment, 
and he planned to continue working with mental 
health professionals through Veterans’ Affairs 
after his release. He had served his sentence, 
addressed his drug use, and stabilized his PTSD. 
He was ready to begin a new chapter in his life.
Instead of being released, however, Perez was 
transferred from prison directly into ICE custody, 
where he spent time in a detention center. Then, 
he was deported to Mexico in March of 2018. 
Drug trafficking convictions are among the 
most damaging types of convictions for a non-
citizen to receive. Under immigration law, all 
selling- and distribution-related offenses, even 
minor ones, are considered drug trafficking. 
Any non-citizens (be they permanent residents 
like Perez, people in the U.S. on visas, refugee 
claimants, or undocumented people) convicted of 
trafficking are subject to mandatory detention and 
virtually assured deportation, with no possibility 
of ever returning to the U.S. In these cases, 
immigration judges are not permitted to consider 
the particulars of an individual’s situation. Like 
judges forced to impose mandatory minimum 
sentences, they must pursue deportation, no 
matter how minor the sales offense.  
Now living in Tijuana, Mexico, Perez’s access to 
mental health treatment is limited. Veterans’ Affairs 
can’t ship medication to him, and specialized 
therapy for PTSD is unavailable. He has had two 
major PTSD episodes since his arrival and is 
terrified that they will continue. He lives alone with 
no family or support network nearby and doesn’t 
know when he’ll see his two young children (both 
U.S. citizens) or his parents again.
Perez understands that he broke the law, but he 
served his sentence and worked hard to control 
his drug use and improve his mental health. “Yes, 
I committed a crime,” he says. “Yes, I pled guilty. 
But yes I served my time. I should go back home 
where my father, my mother, my nieces, my son, 
daughter, my whole community is in Chicago. 
That’s where I belong.” 
Interview conducted October 12, 2018.
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suppliers attract little police scrutiny. “While not entirely 
surprising,” the researchers note, “we were still taken aback 
by the lack of criminal justice and university administration 
attention paid to these dealers, despite the brazenness, 
incompetence, and general dearth of street smarts that tended 
to characterize the dealers’ daily practices.”275
Low-level sellers and distributors 
The vast majority of people involved in drug supplying are 
low-level: there are simply not that many people at the top. 
Most people who sell or distribute drugs do not make much 
money, have little knowledge of the distribution network as a 
whole, and are not involved in profit sharing.276 Many at the 
very bottom of the supply chain are not even paid in cash: 
they receive drugs for their own use, food, or small consumer 
goods. 
Low-level sellers and distributors are among the easiest targets 
for law enforcement, who are often incentivized to seek large 
numbers of arrests to meet quotas.277 Former federal public 
defender Tanya Coke recalls representing “Jose, a 17-year-old 
foster kid who steered customers around the corner to a drug 
dealer whose real name he didn’t even know. His cut of the 
profits? Regular Happy Meals at McDonald’s and a new pair 
of sneakers.” Jose was charged with conspiracy to distribute 
an illegal drug and was facing 10 to 12 years in prison. Cases 
like his, she said, represented half her caseload.278 Daniel 
Conklin, former staff attorney at the Pennsylvania Immigrant 
Resource Center, commented, “I represent a lot of guys with 
drug trafficking convictions, but I’ve never represented a drug 
trafficker.”279 
As a result of their greater numbers and disproportionate 
vulnerability to arrest compared to those higher up the supply 
chain, low-level suppliers make up the majority of people 
in prison for selling- and distribution-related offenses. In 
2016, only 12.5% of those sent to federal prison for selling 
or distribution were high-level suppliers or importers.280 In 
the same year, 55% of people sentenced for federal trafficking 
law violations carrying mandatory minimum sentences were 
found guilty only of the lowest-level selling offenses.281 For 
more on who is in federal prison for drug selling broken down 
by their role in the offense, see p. 20.
The plea bargaining process exacerbates the harsh 
criminalization of low-level sellers and distributors. 
Prosecutors commonly offer those charged with selling- or 
distribution-related offenses more lenient treatment in 
exchange for providing information leading to additional 
arrests. Those higher up the supply chain are more likely to 
be able to take advantage of such offers, while those lower 
down may not have any information or contacts to share. 
In the federal system, those with high-level involvement in 
drug distribution networks are similarly able to benefit from 
a mechanism called the “substantial assistance departure,” 
which allows a judge to give a sentence below the mandatory 
minimum if someone is willing and able to offer the 
government assistance with other criminal investigations.282 
As legal scholar Jane Froyd observes, “The combination 
of mandatory minimums for low-level offenders and the 
substantial assistance downward departure for high-level 
offenders has led to disparity in sentencing between offenders 
with varying levels of culpability.”283
Cynthia Powell is currently serving a 25-year prison sentence 
in Florida for agreeing to sell 35 of her prescribed painkillers 
and some muscle relaxant to a confidential informant. The 
informant called her repeatedly before Powell agreed to the 
sale, saying that she was sick and in pain and needed the pills 
to self-medicate. Powell had no prior convictions or arrest 
record and was unemployed and disabled at the time. She was 
offered two years in prison and ten on probation if she agreed 
to assist with one other arrest, or no prison time and ten 
years of probation if she assisted with three arrests. As a one-
time seller talked into the sale by an informant and who had 
been legally prescribed the drugs in question, Powell had no 
information or meaningful assistance to offer the prosecution, 
leading to her 25-year sentence.284 A 2009 report published 
by the Florida Senate Committee on Criminal Justice suggests 
that Powell’s experience reflects a broader trend, noting that 
“the average sentence of inmates who have a lower-level 
trafficking offense is above the mandatory minimum sentence, 
while the average sentence of inmates with a higher-level 
trafficking offense is below the mandatory.”285
Non-citizens, including lawful permanent residents
Drug trafficking convictions are among the most damaging 
types of convictions for a non-citizen to receive286 – and under 
immigration law, all selling- and distribution-related law 
violations, even minor ones, are considered drug trafficking.287 
Conklin, the former staff attorney at the Pennsylvania 
Immigrant Resource Center, commented in an interview with 
Human Rights Watch that it is easier to gain legal status for a 
refugee or asylum-seeker with robbery or assault charges than 
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low-level drug selling or distribution.288  Between 2007 and 
2012, almost 266,000 non-citizens who had a drug conviction 
as their most serious offense were deported; of these, at least 
31% had been convicted of a selling- or distribution-related 
law violation.289 One of these individuals, Miguel Perez Jr., is 
profiled on p. 39.
Any non-citizens (permanent residents, people in the U.S. on 
visas, refugee claimants, or undocumented people) convicted 
of drug trafficking are subject to mandatory detention and 
virtually assured deportation, with no possibility of ever 
returning to the U.S. They are disqualified from almost every 
defense or waiver that might have been available to them if 
their conviction was not selling- or distribution-related.290 In 
these cases, immigration judges are not permitted to consider 
the particulars of an individual’s situation: like judges forced 
to impose mandatory minimum sentences, they must pursue 
deportation, no matter how minor the sales offense or how 
compelling the extenuating circumstances.291 
If immigration authorities have “reason to believe” that a 
non-citizen has ever participated in drug trafficking or that 
they are the spouse or child of someone who has benefited 
from trafficking in the last five years, they are considered 
inadmissible to the U.S., even if they have no convictions 
themselves.292 A person with a drug selling- or distribution-
related conviction can have their asylum or refugee status 
revoked or their application denied, even if the individual can 
show that they would be in danger if they returned to their 
home country.293 In many cases, someone will be deported 
only after they have already served their sentence in a U.S. 
prison, resulting in double punishment. Nearly a quarter 
of those in federal prison for drug selling and distribution 
offenses are non-citizens,294 including 28.9% of those 
sentenced in 2016.295 
Stereotypes about those who supply drugs also significantly 
impact U.S. immigration policy more broadly. For well 
over a century, non-citizens have been accused of causing 
problematic drug use in the U.S., by pushing them on 
innocent Americans (as previously discussed on p. 21). 
The fear of and stigma around people who sell drugs and 
the racist xenophobia of much of the anti-immigration 
movement are mutually reinforcing, and these narratives 
exert significant influence on public opinion and 
policymaking around both issues.296
Women
The 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health found 
that just 1.9% of female respondents reported selling 
illegal drugs in the past year, compared to 4.7% of male 
respondents.297 Women also represent a minority of those in 
prison for selling or distribution. Despite this, incarcerated 
women are much more likely than incarcerated men to be 
in prison for selling offenses. In 2015, 18.5% of women in 
state prison were sentenced for non-possession drug offenses, 
compared to 11.7% of men.298 Of women sentenced to federal 
prison in 2016, 31.6% were sentenced for drug trafficking.299 
Women who are involved with drug selling and distribution 
are disproportionately represented at the lowest levels of 
distribution hierarchies300 and so are disproportionately 
impacted for many of the same reasons as other low-level 
sellers and distributors. (For more on the disproportionate 
criminalization of low-level sellers and distributors, see p. 40.) 
Drug conspiracy charges are particularly damaging for 
women. Women who live with men involved in drug selling 
or distribution (such as their sons or partners) may be 
prosecuted as members of a drug conspiracy for conduct such 
as taking phone messages, collecting the mail, or simply living 
in a house or apartment where drugs are stored or exchanged. 
For a variety of reasons – including but not limited to 
domestic violence, economic dependence, or dependent 
immigration status – women may have difficulty removing 
themselves from a relationship or a household involved 
with drug selling or distribution, leaving them vulnerable to 
prosecution.301 These challenges increase exponentially if the 
women have children whom they are reluctant to leave behind 
but unable to support financially on their own.302 Mothers 
also face losing custody of their children due to alleged drug 
selling or distribution activity – which they may be engaging 
in to support their children in the first place.303
Ramona Brant – sentenced to life in prison in 1995 for 
conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine – observed: 
“There are a lot of women who are in prison because of 
their association with a man. We may not necessarily be 
involved with the crime, but knowing about it is what makes 
us guilty. Just knowing that they’re dealing drugs will bring 
about a guilty conviction.”304 Brant never actually sold any 
drugs. Her abusive boyfriend did, however, and she had 
been present during the transactions. She had tried to leave 
the relationship, but her boyfriend retaliated by beating 
her brother and threatening to beat her mother if she did 
not return to him. In 2015, having served 21 years, Brant’s 
sentence was commuted by President Obama.305 Brant passed 
away in February 2018.306
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Corvain Cooper’s Story
“The judge said on the record 
that he was extraordinarily 
uncomfortable with giving 
a life sentence, without the 
possibility of parole, to a 
34-year-old man with children.”
Corvain Cooper’s mother, Barbara Tillis, used 
to travel five hours each way with her husband, 
daughter and granddaughter to visit him in the 
federal prison in Atwater, California. Now, she 
doesn’t know the next time she’ll see him. Cooper 
has been transferred away from his home state of 
California to a federal prison in Louisiana and the 
family can’t afford the trip to visit him. 
In January of 2013, Cooper was arrested in 
California and charged along with fifty other 
people for conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute 1000 kg of marijuana, along with several 
other offenses related to the financial side of the 
drug selling operation. Cooper was low down 
in the hierarchy of the operation, and hadn’t 
made much money from his participation. But 
conspiracy charges allow prosecutors to charge 
everyone involved in a drug supply operation for 
the same conduct, regardless of their individual 
role. This means that people near the bottom, like 
Cooper, may face the same penalties as those 
near the top. Cooper received a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole. 
Cooper grew up in South Central Los Angeles. 
He loved fashion, and after high school he went 
to work at a clothing store. Around this time, he 
began getting into trouble, and between 1998 and 
2012 he was convicted of a few low-level offenses, 
including petty theft, marijuana possession, and 
possession of cough syrup with codeine for which 
he did not have a prescription. He served nearly a 
year in state prison. 
After he was released in 2012, Cooper worked 
hard to get his life back on track. He began 
focusing on his family, including his two young 
daughters and his passion for clothes. He opened 
a small clothing business in his old Los Angeles 
neighborhood, which his mother says became 
popular in the community.
But in 2013, federal agents showed up at Cooper’s 
house and arrested him as he was about to drive 
one of his daughters to a sports competition. 
Everyone was confused. The family knew that 
Cooper had a tough time several years before, but 
they had watched him mature into a devoted father 
and pour himself into his clothing business. The 
arrest, it turned out, was related to a shipment of 
marijuana that the government had intercepted 
in 2009, years before the arrest. A childhood 
friend of Cooper’s had testified that Cooper had 
been involved in the shipping operation, which 
was sending marijuana from California to North 
Carolina.
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The prosecutor offered Cooper a plea deal of 10 
to 20 years if he agreed to testify against others. 
People with minor roles in drug distribution 
operations are often threatened with severe 
sentences for conspiracy charges if they do not 
testify. Cooper chose to exercise his right to trial, 
believing that the charges he faced were unfair 
given his relatively minor conduct and low-level 
role in the hierarchy. Investigators estimated 
how much marijuana the network might have 
distributed over its entire history of operation, 
and then tried Cooper as if he were personally 
responsible for all of it. He was found guilty on 
October 21, 2013.
At sentencing, the prosecutor sought a life 
sentence for Cooper under the federal “three 
strikes law”, since Cooper had two previous 
possession charges for marijuana and 
codeine. Black people, such as Cooper, are 
disproportionately likely to be prosecuted for 
drug possession compared to white people. For 
this reason, three strikes laws have a particularly 
severe impact on their communities. Many people, 
like Cooper, have ended up in prison for life after 
a single nonviolent possession with intent to 
distribute charge, because of prior possession 
arrests.
His mother described how awful it was to be far 
away during the trial. “We weren’t there for the 
sentencing, and we weren’t there for anything. 
And none of us had money to go, so you know, we 
did the best we could. We sent him a suit to go to 
court in and tried to send whatever he needed, you 
know. But that was, you know, all that we could 
do.”
Cooper challenged the sentence as “cruel and 
unusual punishment”, forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution, but the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and later 
the Supreme Court denied his appeal. His 2015 
petition to President Obama for clemency was 
denied.
Since then, voters in California have approved 
two measures, reducing many drug felonies 
like Cooper’s to misdemeanors and legalizing 
marijuana. Under the new laws, Cooper’s 
conviction for possession of cough syrup with 
codeine and his felony marijuana charge were 
both reduced to misdemeanors. These new laws 
gave Cooper and his lawyer fresh hope. 
Early last year, Cooper went back to court to 
explain that his two prior felonies were no longer 
considered felonies and therefore should not 
be considered “strikes”. The court refused to 
reconsider his sentence. In July 2018, Cooper filed 
a new petition with the Supreme Court, which 
was recently denied. As of now, his only hope is 
that the president will grant him clemency and 
commute his life sentence. 
“When they led him into the courtroom,” Patrick 
Megaro, Cooper’s lawyer said, “the judge 
said on the record that he was extraordinarily 
uncomfortable with giving a life sentence, without 
the possibility of parole, to a 34-year-old man with 
children on a case like this. Since then, we’ve been 
fighting and fighting and fighting and we’re hoping 
that somebody will see the madness in all of this.”
Interviews conducted September 7 and 18, 2018.
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Who is Most Harshly Criminalized by 
Selling and Distribution Laws?, cont.
The lived experience of women who are involved with 
drug selling or distribution is complex, bound up with 
gender presentation, class, race, and other intersecting 
axes of identity. Some women involved with drug selling 
or distribution report feeling they are less likely than 
men to attract law enforcement attention, since they do 
not fit the stereotype of typically-male drug sellers. This 
is especially true for women who are some combination 
of white, conventionally feminine, and can pass as 
middle class. Some women who sell drugs perceive that 
customers appreciate that they seem less threatening and 
more discreet than men who sell drugs, and prefer to buy 
from them when possible.307 Others suggest that men 
prefer to hire women to play peripheral roles in their 
distribution networks because they are less likely to be 
suspected of drug-related activity.308 Criminologist Jamie 
J. Fader found that the male Philadelphia drug sellers that 
she interviewed liked to use women’s places of residence 
to store their drug supply, because the men believed that 
women were less likely to attract police attention.309 
By contrast, other women who sell drugs, especially women 
of color,  feel that they stick out to law enforcement.310 They 
report facing extremely harsh treatment if arrested, in part 
because they are being punished not only for their drug-
related conduct but for deviating from behavior perceived 
to be gender-appropriate.311 Women who sell or distribute 
drugs are also vulnerable to gender-based violence, both from 
law enforcement and from male buyers or fellow sellers.312 
In addition, women may be paid less than men who play 
comparable roles in the supply chain, mirroring the workplace 
discrimination of the legal labor market.313 
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Rethinking the Criminalization of People
Involved in Drug Selling or Distribution 
The contrast between the professed purpose of our current 
system of supply-side criminalization and its actual impact 
is stark. It does not reduce problematic drug use or keep 
people who use drugs safer. It does not reduce violence. It 
does not reduce the availability of drugs. It disproportionately 
impacts the lowest-level people in the supply chain and 
does little to change the behavior of those at the top. It is 
a system built on a foundation of racism that continues to 
have a discriminatory impact on people of color and other 
marginalized communities. 
The vilification of 
people involved with 
drug selling and 
distribution has been 
so successful that few 
people, even within 
the drug policy reform 
movement, have 
challenged the myriad 
injustices of this aspect 
of the drug war.
It is time to change this. It is time to rethink how we address 
the supply side of the drug economy with the same goals that 
drive our approach to drug use: reducing harms, promoting 
health and well-being, preventing violence, and repairing the 
damage done by the war on drugs. Policymakers, advocates, 
researchers and drug-involved people must together develop 
an evidence-based, equity-oriented policy framework for 
addressing illegal drug markets. 
While working toward an approach to the supply side of the 
drug economy that keeps communities safe and healthy, we 
must remember that people who sell or distribute drugs are 
also part of these communities: they are parents, grandparents, 
children and friends who often cannot be distinguished from 
the other residents of the neighborhoods in which they live 
and work.314 They are also experts on the functioning of the 
supply side of the drug economy and the incentives that drive 
their choices. Their input will be crucial to any evidence-based 
policymaking process.
Below, we lay out the beginning of a reform agenda, starting 
with the kind of incremental reforms that advocates can start 
pursuing now. We then pose a series of key questions that we 
hope will spur further discussion and exploration. Answering 
these questions is central to pursuing more fundamental 
changes to the current system.
Our recommendations are based on three broad principles. 
First, to the maximum extent possible, society should deal 
with drug-involvement outside the failed apparatus of 
criminalization – and to the extent that drug selling and 
distribution remain part of the criminal justice system, they 
must be approached with a commitment to proportionality, 
racial equity, and due process. Second, we should focus 
on reducing the harms of drug distribution, rather than 
attempting to eliminate any and all drug market activity. 
Third, we must take seriously the discriminatory past and 
present of the criminalization of drug selling and distribution, 
while working toward reforms that both repair the damage 
already done and prevent further damage to communities of 
color and poor communities.
Policing and prosecutorial reform
District attorneys and police departments, as well as 
individual prosecutors and police officers, play an outsized 
role in criminalizing selling and distribution: they decide 
who to target for arrest, who to charge, and what to charge 
them with. Reform in this area will begin to address the 
disproportionate criminalization of people who are low-
level sellers and distributors, live with poverty, sell to 
support their own drug use, or are people of color impacted 
by discriminatory enforcement practices. Policing and 
prosecutorial reform can also help to address the problematic 
ways that the system determines who to treat as a drug user 
and who to treat as a drug seller, as well as how the plea 
bargaining process disadvantages those who are lower down in 
drug supplying hierarchies. 
Police departments must incentivize officers to focus on 
investigating situations that pose a bona fide threat to 
public safety, rather than simply making large numbers of 
arrests. This must involve, among other things, reviewing 
performance metrics and assessing staff culture. While it may 
at times be appropriate for police to devote attention to those 
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at the very top of drug distribution hierarchies, in general they 
should deprioritize conduct related to selling and distribution 
alone. Instead, they should focus on enforcing laws against 
threats, coercion, or conduct that causes physical harm to 
another person. Laws against harassment, assault, homicide 
and so on give law enforcement ample grounds on which to 
arrest people – be they drug-involved or not – who pose a true 
threat to public safety.
Racial bias in law enforcement extends far beyond drug selling 
and distribution, but limiting discretion in drug selling- or 
distribution-related arrests and prosecutions – for example by 
narrowing what constitutes acceptable indicia of sale – can 
help reduce its impact. Law enforcement should develop 
guidelines that require police officers and prosecutors to treat 
drug cases as simple possession unless there is clear, objective 
evidence that a person was involved in selling or distribution. 
They must stop using indicia like drugs packaged in separate 
baggies and weight thresholds for personal use that are 
unreasonably low. 
Better data collection – by both police departments and 
district attorneys – is also a crucial step toward reforming the 
current system. Timely, publicly available data about arrests 
and charging decisions in all drug cases, disaggregated by 
alleged role in the supply chain, race, ethnicity, gender, drug 
type, and other relevant factors, is vital to monitoring and 
addressing the role that bias plays in these decisions. Evidence 
suggests that a white person caught with the same amount of 
a drug as a person of color, and with similar indicia of sale, 
is more likely to be charged with possession for personal use 
while a similarly situated person of color may be more likely 
to be charged with possession with intent to distribute. Given 
the racist history of the enforcement of drug selling- and 
distribution-related laws, this claim is a critical one for further 
exploration. Currently, however, we lack the necessary data. 
Advocates should work to elect and support district attorneys 
who commit to not prosecuting low-level selling- and 
distribution-related offenses, including: sharing or giving 
away drugs for free; subsistence selling; selling by people who 
are struggling to control their own drug use; drug-induced 
homicide charges; and conspiracy charges against low-level 
actors in drug-supplying hierarchies. Prosecutors must also 
stop the practice of deliberately overcharging drug-involved 
defendants to compel plea bargains or to coerce people 
into becoming confidential informants. In general, district 
attorneys should decline to prosecute cases when someone’s 
involvement in drug selling- or distribution-related activity 
was peripheral to the supply chain or when they are not part 
of a sophisticated drug distribution operation or involved in 
violence. If low-level actors are prosecuted at all, they should 
be prosecuted only for their specific conduct, rather than the 
conduct of the entire drug supplying network. Prosecutors 
should also avoid requesting criminal history-based sentencing 
enhancements, especially in cases when someone’s criminal 
history is the result of cycles of drug involvement and when 
someone poses a limited threat to public safety.
Finally, both police departments and district attorneys should 
cooperate with harm reduction advocates, public health 
professionals, and social service organizations to develop 
specialized pre-booking and pre-charge diversion programs 
for people involved in the supply-side of the drug economy. 
These programs must also be accessible to people without 
going through the criminal justice system. Any diversion 
program for people involved in drug selling or distribution 
must be tailored to address the specific needs that someone 
is addressing through supply-side drug activity. For example, 
this could include education, job training or mentorship if 
they are selling because they can’t access legal employment, or 
voluntary referrals to treatment or harm reduction services if 
they are selling to fund their own drug use.
While custom-designed programs for people involved on 
the supply side of the drug economy are vital, good models 
already do exist for programs that include at least some 
people who sell or distribute drugs. The Law Enforcement 
Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program in Santa Fe, New Mexico 
provides an opportunity for law enforcement to refer people 
who otherwise would be arrested for certain low-level drug 
offenses to intensive, trauma-informed case management. 
LEAD is based on a harm reduction model for all services, 
does not require abstinence, and includes no sanctions 
for continued drug involvement. While Santa Fe’s LEAD 
program does exclude people who are believed to be “selling 
illicit substances for profit above a subsistence income,” people 
who sell drugs to support their own drug use and survival at a 
subsistence level are explicitly designated as LEAD-eligible.315 
Sentencing Reform
Any criminal sanctions for drug selling or distribution should 
be proportionate to the real damage caused by someone’s 
conduct. Any sanctions must reflect the fact that in most 
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cases it is not sellers or distributors who cause the harms 
of chaotic drug use. At both the federal and state levels, 
policymakers should review and revise all sentencing policies 
that result in disproportionate punishments for supply-side 
drug market activity, especially for low-level actors. This 
includes reforming criminal history sentencing enhancements, 
expanding safety valve provisions, and eliminating mandatory 
minimum sentences so that judges may make decisions on an 
individualized basis. 
Sentencing reform advocates have already made some 
headway in this area. The federal First Step Act, signed into 
law in December 2018, reduces (from life to 25 years, and 
from 20 to 15 years) the enhanced mandatory minimum 
sentences imposed on people convicted of multiple selling- 
and distribution-related offenses. For those convicted of 
a first time selling or distribution offense or a subsequent 
law violation involving a small amount of a drug, it cut the 
mandatory minimum sentence in half, from 10 years to 5 
years. It also retroactively applies the reforms from the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (which reduced the crack and powder 
cocaine sentencing disparity from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1 and is 
discussed further on p. 34). The First Step Act also expands 
safety valve eligibility, giving judges more leeway to impose 
sentences below the mandatory minimums. Further expansion 
of safety valve eligibility or – better yet – elimination of 
mandatory minimum sentences altogether would allow judges 
to consider an individual’s circumstances and the severity of 
their specific conduct before sentencing. 
California’s Repeal Ineffective Sentencing Enhancement 
(RISE) Act is a state-level example of sentencing reform 
that mitigates some severely disproportionate sentences for 
people involved in supply-side drug market activity. Signed 
into law in October 2017, the RISE Act amends a section of 
California’s criminal code that added three years to sentences 
for people convicted of certain nonviolent drug offenses if 
the person had previously been convicted of a similar offense, 
an enhancement that affected many with low-level sales 
cases. The RISE Act will meaningfully reduce the degree to 
which low-level sellers and distributors are over-criminalized 
in California, while mitigating the discriminatory impact of 
criminal history-based sentencing. 
Advocates can also push back on drug-induced homicide 
laws and other criminalization-based responses to the current 
overdose crisis, such as increasing penalties for fentanyl 
distribution. In 2016 Senator Kelly Ayotte introduced an 
amendment to an unrelated bill that would have dramatically 
reduced the weight thresholds triggering mandatory 
minimum sentences for those who sold or distributed any 
product containing fentanyl, setting the thresholds so low that 
they would have almost certainly ensnared users as well. If the 
amendment had passed, selling 0.1 grams of fentanyl would 
have received a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence – the 
same sentence as 50 grams of methamphetamine, 100 grams 
of PCP, 280 grams of crack cocaine, 5000 grams of powder 
cocaine, or 1000 grams of heroin. Thanks to the work of 
advocates, the amendment never came up for a vote.  
Those pushing defelonization initiatives in their states can 
engage with supply-side reform in two ways. These initiatives 
typically aim to reclassify drug possession from a felony to a 
misdemeanor; to date, no state has defelonized any low-level 
selling offenses. In jurisdictions where it is politically viable, 
advocates working on defelonization should push for low-
level selling- and distribution-related offenses to be reclassified 
as misdemeanors as well. Even advocates working to just 
defelonize possession, however, can incorporate measures to 
reduce the over-reach of supply-side criminalization.
Over the past several years, states such as California, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Connecticut, Alaska and Oregon have 
reclassified drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor. 
In most of these states, no maximum weight threshold was 
set to qualify for a misdemeanor possession charge; Oregon, 
however, set the maximum weight threshold for defelonization 
extremely low (for example, one gram of heroin or two grams 
of cocaine). To keep as many drug-involved people as possible 
from being prosecuted for felony drug offenses, thresholds 
for defelonization of possession – where they exist – must be 
set as high as possible and reflect realistic understandings of 
how much of a drug a regular user is likely to have on hand. 
Otherwise, people who use drugs – even those who were not 
involved in selling – will continue to get charged as sellers 
with felonies, despite the defelonization of possession.
While forward-looking reforms like those outlined above are 
essential, prisons are already full of people serving decades-
long sentences for minor selling- and distribution-related 
conduct. Retroactive resentencing and offense reclassification 
is a vital component of any supply-side criminal justice 
reform agenda. Proposition 64, which legalized marijuana in 
California in 2016, is an example of how such reforms can 
be built into broader drug policy and criminal justice reform 
legislation. In addition to legalizing marijuana possession, 
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Prop. 64 reduced penalties for other marijuana-related 
law violations, including non-possession offenses. Eligible 
offenses include cultivation of marijuana, possession with 
intent to sell marijuana, and sales or transport of marijuana. 
Possession with intent to sell marijuana, which was formerly 
a felony punishable by up to three years in prison, became 
a misdemeanor in most circumstances, punishable by a 
combination of drug education and community service. Prop. 
64 also provided a mechanism for people with qualifying prior 
convictions to petition a court to have their sentences reduced 
or reclassified to bring them in line with Prop. 64 reforms.316
We lack vitally important data on who is ending up in prison 
for these offenses and what role they played in drug supplying 
hierarchies. While some publicly available data at the federal 
level does disaggregate those sentenced for supply-side drug 
offenses by their role in the supply chain, these data are the 
exception rather than the rule, and are often outdated by 
the time they are made available. They also do not break the 
data down further to examine the race, ethnicity and gender 
of those incarcerated for their role at the various levels of the 
supply chain, or to explore the length of sentence each group 
received for comparable conduct. 
Publicly available state data is often abysmal, failing even to 
separate those sentenced for possession from those sentenced 
for sales-related offenses. No state makes data available on 
people incarcerated for selling- and distribution-related 
conduct disaggregated by their role in the supply chain, much 
less data cross-tabulating this information by demographic 
details. To lay the groundwork for evidence-based evaluation 
and reform, state and federal court and prison systems must 
make more comprehensive data available on who is in prison 
for drug selling- or distribution-related offenses.
Immigration reform
Selling- and distribution-related offenses result in particularly 
severe consequences for those without U.S. citizenship. 
These consequences are in many cases vastly disproportionate 
to the actual harm caused by someone’s conduct and can 
have serious impacts on an individual, their family, and 
community when they result in denial of legal status or 
deportation. Human Rights Watch’s report, A Price Too High: 
U.S. Families Torn Apart by Deportations for Drug Offenses317 
highlights this issue and provides the foundation for DPA’s 
recommendations below.
The immigration system, like the criminal justice system, 
currently lumps a broad range of drug selling- and 
distribution-related conduct together, under the assumption 
that any involvement at all on the supply side of the drug 
economy means that an individual is a threat to public safety 
and should not be permitted in the U.S. An Attorney General 
opinion issued in 2002 states that for immigration purposes, 
“unlawful trafficking in controlled substances presumptively 
constitute ‘particularly serious crimes’ […] and only under the 
most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary 
and compelling would departure from this interpretation be 
warranted or permissible.”318 
The federal government must enact reforms to the 
immigration system that ensure the totality of an individual’s 
conduct and circumstances are considered in immigration-
related decisions. Decision-makers must be empowered to 
assess drug selling- or distribution-related activity on a case 
by case basis while determining eligibility for U.S. visas, 
permanent residency, citizenship or deportation. These 
decisions must be based on whether an individual poses a 
true threat to public safety, instead of assuming that people 
involved in drug selling or distribution are inherently 
dangerous or violent. Any criminal justice contact must 
be weighed against the negative effects of deportation or 
denial of status on the individual, their family, and their 
community. The federal government should also implement 
a “statute of limitations” in the immigration system, 
requiring that convictions for selling- and distribution-
related offenses that took place a certain number of years ago 
do not trigger deportation or mandatory detention, absent 
other conduct suggesting that an individual poses a current 
threat to public safety. 
Currently, people without U.S. citizenship are not able to 
fully benefit from many aspects of well-meaning criminal 
justice reform. Even if a past conviction has been expunged, 
pardoned, vacated or is otherwise no longer recognized by 
the jurisdiction where it occurred, it may still be considered a 
conviction for the purposes of immigration decision-making. 
All branches of government must work together to ensure 
that non-citizens do not face immigration consequences for 
criminal justice conduct that is no longer recognized in the 
jurisdiction where it occurred.
State and local governments must ensure that any diversion 
programs they develop do not require guilty pleas from 
individuals wishing to participate, since for non-citizens 
guilty pleas may trigger deportation, mandatory detention, 
and other immigration consequences, even if an individual 
successfully completes the diversion program. Local law 
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enforcement and prosecutors must also consider potential 
immigration consequences while engaging in plea negotiations 
with someone who is a non-citizen, or when considering a 
non-citizen’s application for post-conviction relief. Generally, 
advocates and policymakers should consult with immigration 
policy experts and consider the potential immigration 
consequences of any reform for those involved with drug 
selling or distribution, to ensure that non-citizens are not 
excluded from its benefits.
Addressing collateral consequences
Reducing – and when possible, eliminating – collateral 
consequences for criminal justice system involvement helps 
to ensure that people who have been in the system are able 
to meet their needs and those of their families through 
legal labor market participation. This includes eliminating 
restrictions on obtaining professional or business licenses 
for those with selling and distribution convictions, absent a 
specific public safety concern arising out of the particulars of 
an individual’s case. 
Policymakers must also restore the eligibility of people 
who have been convicted of supply-related offenses for 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, 
colloquially known as food stamps) and Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF, short-term cash benefits). 
Currently, people with one conviction are ineligible for two 
years and ineligible for life after a second conviction.319 Any 
restrictions on who can live in public housing must be based 
on actual evidence that a person is likely to pose a safety 
threat to the community; currently, blanket bans for any drug 
involvement are the norm.320 
Similarly, the child welfare consequences of drug selling- or 
distribution-related charges must be based on actual evidence 
that a child’s safety is at risk, rather than on the assumption 
that no one who has ever been charged with these offenses is 
fit to parent. This is especially crucial in light of the fact that 
some women, many of whom are caregivers, are criminalized 
for drug selling or distribution due to a partner or family 
member’s involvement, as discussed on p. 41.
In addition to removing the above-noted barriers, 
policymakers and criminal justice system actors must 
support robust re-entry programs to ensure people leaving 
prison are able to access affordable housing, meaningful, 
living wage employment, and other support programs as 
they transition back into their communities. The more 
successful people leaving prison can be at achieving a 
sustainable and satisfying existence through legal channels, 
the less likely it is that they will become involved in drug 
selling or distribution post-release.
Reducing the harms of drug distribution
Adopting a harm reduction approach to the supply side of the 
drug economy means two things: first, it means ensuring that 
the criminalization of selling- and distribution-related activity 
does not get in the way of existing harm reduction initiatives 
aimed at people who use drugs, and that retail-level drug 
sellers are fully engaged in keeping their customers safe. 
Second, it means developing policies that reduce the harms 
caused by supply-side drug market activity, rather than 
focusing only on the elimination of drug markets. Absent the 
legal regulation of drugs, illegal drug markets are here to stay 
– and while we should ultimately consider legal regulation as 
the most comprehensive way to eliminate harms related to the 
illegal market,321 in the meantime a harm reduction approach 
to the supply side of the drug economy can encourage these 
markets to operate as safely as possible for both drug-involved 
people and those who share communities with them. 
To ensure that the criminalization of selling- and 
distribution-related activity does not get in the way of 
existing harm reduction policies aimed at people who use 
drugs, state governments should expand their 911 Good 
Samaritan laws to decriminalize selling- and distribution-
related offenses at the scene of an overdose. This is necessary 
to ensure that fear of arrest for selling and distribution does 
not undercut the life-saving intent of these laws. Vermont’s 
911 Good Samaritan law offers a good model: it provides 
immunity at the scene of an overdose for any drug-related 
offense, including selling and distribution.322 
While anecdotally it is clear that some people involved in drug 
selling and distribution are already involved in harm reduction 
initiatives, stigma and harsh criminalization currently get in 
the way of unlocking the full potential of drug sellers as harm 
reductionists on a broad scale. Public health officials and 
service providers who work with drug-involved people should 
provide retail-level drug sellers with the resources they need to 
educate their customers about drug effects and overdose risk; 
distribute sterile drug equipment such as syringes, cookers and 
pipes; provide naloxone to their customers; and disseminate 
drug checking information and supplies. This work can be 
aided by federal and state governments repealing criminal 
penalties for possession of drug checking equipment and 
drug paraphernalia, and by creating funding streams for the 
distribution of sterile supplies and naloxone. 
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“It’s really bad, that they go to 
the extent that they do to get  
a bust.” 
Until Kenneth Mack entered a long-term 
methadone treatment program, the only thing he 
cared about was getting his next bag of heroin. He 
would do almost anything not to feel the sickness 
of withdrawal. His struggles to control his drug 
use had left him isolated from his family and 
friends, but methadone opened a new chapter in 
his life.
Mack was introduced to heroin at the discos in 
New York in the 1970s. He started going to enjoy 
the freedoms the discos offered, a place where 
people of different backgrounds could come 
together and have a good time. “I was introduced 
to cocaine, heroin, and things of that nature in the 
club. At first it was just fun, but after a while it was 
an area to escape from the realities of everyday 
living,” he explained. 
Selling drugs helped him to pay for the drugs he 
needed to self-medicate for mental health issues 
related to his rocky childhood. Mack’s mother 
is Jewish, and his father is African American. In 
the Brooklyn projects in the 1960s when he was 
growing up, it wasn’t easy to be biracial. “On 
our way to school, we used to get ridiculed,” he 
explained, “we used to be called zebras, have 
eggs thrown at us, rocks, all types of stuff.” 
When Mack was six years old his parents split 
up, and his mother was left to raise him and his 
siblings on her own. As a teenager, Mack got a 
job at a bead shop to help support his family. 
He made only minimum wage, but it helped 
supplement his mother’s low income. 
When he moved out on his own as a teenager, 
he wasn’t able to support himself on minimum 
wage. He hadn’t completed high school, so better 
paid work was hard to find, and he started selling 
drugs to make ends meet. He continued to help 
out his mom and siblings as well. In his early 
twenties, he was arrested and sentenced to two-
and-a-half to five years in prison. He left prison 
committed to piecing his life back together. He 
had earned his GED, and managed to get a job for 
the neighborhood work program. He later became 
a site supervisor. 
Mack eventually relapsed and began using 
heroin again. He had tried taking prescription 
psychotropic medication to help with his mental 
health issues, but they made him feel like a 
zombie and like he couldn’t take care of himself 
effectively. Heroin had fewer unpleasant side 
effects, and he was completely reliant on it for his 
daily functioning. 
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“I was using heroin anywhere from ten bags to 
20 bags a day. That may sound insane, but the 
craving for it is outrageous – because you want to 
feel normal.” He describes how withdrawal led to 
unbearable vomiting, diarrhea, and hot and cold 
flashes. He remembers feeling like he couldn’t 
tolerate being in his own skin.
Mack relied on heroin for years, until he 
connected with a methadone treatment program. 
“It keeps you from going out there and having 
to steal, sell drugs, or anything else to get high. 
It’s really hard to explain because I can hold a 
job now, but with active addiction it was hard to 
hold a job because you always had to be after 
the heroin.” He now works part time and has 
reconnected with his family.
He travels by bus and then train, one hour each 
way, from the Bronx to his methadone program in 
Brooklyn, which dispenses the medication to him 
each morning. He goes every day except Sunday, 
when the clinic is closed. For his Sunday dose, 
the clinic sends him home with a take-home bottle 
of tablets on Saturday. On Mondays, he brings the 
bottle back to the clinic.
Police routinely hang out in the area around 
the clinic, stopping and frisking patients. They 
say that this is necessary to stop people from 
selling their methadone on the street. But this 
police preoccupation with criminalizing people 
who might be selling drugs is actually getting 
in the way of people who use drugs – like 
Kenneth – accessing effective treatment. Treating 
everyone accessing the methadone program as 
potential drug sellers contributes to the ongoing 
stigmatization of methadone patients, turning 
many off the idea of seeking this life-saving 
treatment.
Mack dreads Mondays especially, since he has 
an empty methadone bottle with him. He worries 
the police will use this as evidence that he’s been 
selling. “They make me take my socks off in the 
street to see if I have something in my shoes. And 
I mean it’s really bad. They – the only thing they 
don’t do is have me take my pants off, you know? 
And that is – it’s just bad. It’s really bad, that they 
go to the extent that they do to get a bust.” 
Some days, his anxiety about interacting with 
the police is so severe that he skips going to the 
program altogether. He feels it’s only a matter of 
time before it’s his turn to be arrested on a selling-
related charge. “I am supposed to go every day 
but I just sometimes don’t go because I don’t 
want it to be my turn.”
Interview conducted September 23, 2018.  
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Harm reduction offers a powerful framework for policy 
approaches to the subset of drug markets that are associated 
with violence. Traditional law enforcement responses to these 
markets have failed to decrease their volatility, and may be 
making them more dangerous.323 As many drug markets 
operate largely violence-free, however, policy interventions 
should aim to guide violent drug markets to operate more 
like those that are nonviolent.  By focusing on the specific 
characteristics of specific drug markets that may be driving 
violence – rather than assuming that drug markets must be 
eradicated altogether to reduce violence – policymakers and 
advocates stand a much better chance at improving public 
safety.  
Researchers Jonathan Caulkins and Peter Reuter, for example, 
propose that if the police identify a particular drug supplier 
who is known to engage in violence, they should offer that 
individual incentives to behave in a less violent way rather 
than immediately prosecuting them. “Sellers,” they observe, 
“are primarily motivated by something other than thwarting 
harm reduction.” They speculate that “there are ways of 
manipulating the market into achieving more of what law 
enforcement wants (less harm) without inducing pushback 
by the market.”324 More research is needed to develop and 
evaluate evidence-based best practices about what these 
approaches could look like.
While we are aware of no community-based violence 
reduction programs aimed specifically at people who sell and 
distribute drugs, there are analogous programs that work to 
reduce other types of violence. Such programs offer instructive 
models for the kind of approaches that may more effectively 
address supply-side drug market violence. Advance Peace, for 
example, is an organization dedicated to ending cyclical and 
retaliatory gun violence in urban neighborhoods by investing 
in the development, health and wellbeing of those at the center 
of these dynamics. Through their Peacemaker Fellowship 
program, they provide responsive developmental services 
to young adults identified as most likely to be perpetrators 
and/or victims of gun violence, with the goal of connecting 
these youth to culturally responsive and empathetic human, 
social and economic opportunities. They also hire formerly 
incarcerated people as street outreach leaders who intervene in 
conflicts, broker social services and steer individuals away from 
violence.325 Their programs developed out of the Richmond, 
California Office of Neighborhood Safety and received a 
positive evaluation from the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency.326 While a great deal of further study is needed 
to assess what kinds of programs are the most effective at 
reducing drug market-related violence, models like this offer a 
promising place to start.
Some have speculated that the emergence of new technologies 
such as cell phones and online platforms for drug transactions 
have reduced the prevalence of drug market-related violence 
by making transactions more predictable and less reliant on 
foot traffic, and by providing online forums where buyers can 
exchange information about reliable sellers and the potency 
of available products.327 Some online drug markets are 
already involved in harm reduction by forbidding the sale of 
substances that have a “short history of human consumption” 
or incentivizing vendors to sell naloxone, as discussed on  
p. 15.328 Policymakers and researchers should continue to 
explore the potential of online drug markets to reduce the 
harms of drug distribution. 
Education and destigmatization 
The stigmatization of people who sell or distribute drugs 
shows little sign of weakening and may even have worsened 
in the context of the current overdose crisis. But until we 
recognize that people who sell drugs are people – and often 
not the people that stereotypes would suggest – it will be 
challenging to gain support for changing policy in this area. 
The Drug Policy Alliance is committed to advocacy and 
communications campaigns that destigmatize people who 
sell or distribute drugs, while teaching people about the truth 
behind the stereotypes. We must also educate policymakers 
and the public about the nuanced and diverse reality of 
supply-side drug market activity, as well as about the failure 
of the current system of criminalization to keep communities 
healthy and safe.
Demonstrating that supply-side approaches do not reduce – 
and may actually increase – the harms of drug use is especially 
urgent. Absent widespread understanding of what actually 
does put people’s well-being at risk, the notion that people 
who sell or distribute drugs are to blame for overdoses and 
other harms of drug use continues to flourish. Along with 
assumptions about the relationship between drug markets and 
violence, this is a particularly pernicious barrier to reform. 
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We cannot develop effective approaches to the supply side of 
the drug economy without evidence – and existing research 
in this area is riddled with gaps. In some cases, it also reflects 
researcher biases and is grounded in many of the same 
stereotypes that inform our failed system of criminalization. 
Advocates and policymakers must work with researchers to 
pursue research on drug markets that overcomes common 
biases and fills gaps in the existing literature, and government 
agencies must fund this kind of policy-relevant research. 
Researchers tend to focus on the most conspicuous drug 
markets: those that are associated with violence and those 
that take place outdoors, in urban locations, and involve 
buyers and sellers who don’t know each other outside of the 
sales relationship. They also tend to draw their samples from 
drug markets that resemble those that the researchers already 
assume exist. If they assume that violence is an inherent 
component of drug markets, for example, they may look 
for drug markets to study by examining areas where violent 
crime rates are high. If they assume that drug selling and 
distribution take place primarily in communities that are poor, 
urban and non-white, they are likely to look for drug markets 
to study in such neighborhoods.329 
Markets that are the most stereotypical, obvious and accessible 
to researchers end up over-sampled in the literature.330 These 
are the same markets that are already over-represented in the 
criminal justice system, the media, and political discourse, 
which perpetuates the stereotypes that drove researchers to 
produce biased research in the first place.331 Nonviolent drug 
markets, those that take place indoors, those outside of urban 
areas, and those that exist primarily within social networks 
remain understudied.332 
We especially need more comparative research on drug 
markets. Ross Coomber calls for “a research approach that 
starts from expecting difference [between drug markets] 
rather than attempting consolidation.”333 Drug markets are 
not monolithic, and we can learn a lot from exploring the 
effects of their differences on how they operate. Researchers 
should explore the similarities and differences between a 
wide range of drug markets, including but not limited to: 
online and offline drug markets; geographically variable 
markets; historical analyses of drug markets over time; drug 
markets serving different demographics of clientele; indoor 
and outdoor drug markets; markets where buyers and sellers 
don’t know each other outside of the sales relationship and 
markets that are dominated by social networks; markets that 
are more organized and those that are more casual or smaller 
scale; markets that take place in communities where sellers 
and/or buyers live as well as those where actors travel from 
elsewhere to engage in transactions; markets for a variety of 
different types of drugs; and markets in which buyers are able 
to access relatively reliable products and those that are more 
unpredictable. 
If reducing the violence associated with some drug markets 
is a central policy goal, studying nonviolent drug markets is 
especially urgent: Ross Coomber calls for “data and analyses 
that focus not on why violence does occur [in some drug 
markets] but on why it doesn’t [in others].”334 Researchers 
who examine drug markets that are associated with violence 
often do not explore in detail whether or not the violence 
observed is driven solely or primarily by drug activity. In 
some cases, the examined areas would likely experience fairly 
high rates of violence even absent drug activity.335 A more 
nuanced examination of the factors that drive drug market 
volatility – without assuming an a priori link between drug 
market activity and violence – is an urgent priority, along with 
research on and evaluation of programs designed to guide 
more volatile drug markets to take more stable forms.
Sociologists Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls observed that 
while much of the existing literature focuses on drug markets 
in large cities, this research had little relevance to the small 
city drug market where they conducted their research. They 
note that “the lack of anonymity, inability of dealers to choose 
better locations, and their long-term resident status” all 
influenced the form that their small city drug market took, 
with significant implications for policymaking.336 In addition 
to drug markets in both small and large cities, researchers 
should explore other forms of geographical variability, 
including drug markets that operate in rural areas, in different 
regions, and online.
While assessing the actual demographics of those who 
participate in supply-side drug market activity presents 
significant methodological challenges, we need better 
information about who participates and their roles in the 
supply chain. Researchers should pay particular attention to 
the experiences of non-Black, non-Latinx people of color, as 
well as LGBTQIA+ and non-binary people – groups who are 
all but absent from the existing literature. Researchers can 
also support advocates and policymakers by comprehensively 
examining the ways that people who sell drugs are already 
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involved in harm reduction initiatives, evaluating the impacts 
of these activities, and analyzing existing barriers to expanding 
successful programs and practices. 
Little research currently exists on the impact of harsh supply-
side criminalization on overdose rates. Preliminary evidence 
suggests that the current system may be undermining 911 
Good Samaritan laws337 and increasing overdoses by removing 
trusted sellers from the market,338 but more research is 
urgently needed in this area, particularly given the magnitude 
of the current crisis. 
Researchers should also explore the drug quantities that 
people who use drugs can be reasonably expected to have in 
their possession (taking into account geographical variation) 
to provide an evidence base for the creation of realistic weight 
thresholds when required to make statutory distinctions 
between people who possess drugs for personal use and those 
who are involved in drug selling and distribution. While 
such clear cut distinctions between people who use or sell 
drugs should be avoided when possible (as discussed on p. 
36), ensuring that existing weight thresholds are realistic and 
reflect actual patterns of drug use can minimize the likelihood 
that people who possess drugs solely for personal use will be 
criminalized under laws against drug selling and distribution.
Researchers should further explore the role that economic and 
social conditions play in contributing to people’s decisions to 
participate in drug markets, and the kinds of social policy that 
can impact these decisions. Further study is also needed on 
the types of policies and incentives that actually work to get 
people out of drug selling or distribution in a sustainable way.
Finally, researchers and policymakers should include 
people who are or have been involved in drug selling- and 
distribution-related activity in every step of their research and 
policymaking processes. People with selling- and distribution-
related experience are experts in how drug markets function 
and the incentives and pressures that drive their choices, and 
their involvement will be crucial to crafting effective policy 
solutions to drug market harms while minimizing unintended 
consequences. Researchers and policymakers should recruit 
people with experience working in as wide a range of drug 
markets as possible to develop policies that are relevant to an 
array of different supply chains.
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Where to Begin
For police and prosecutors: 
  In most cases, police should deprioritize arresting people 
for conduct related to selling and distribution alone. 
Instead, they should focus on enforcing laws against 
threats, coercion, exploitation, corruption and conduct 
that causes physical harm to another person. 
  Police departments should review performance metrics 
and address issues that may encourage officers to pursue a 
large number of low-level sales and distribution arrests.
  Prosecutors should decline to prosecute certain selling- 
and distribution-related offenses, such as: sharing or 
giving away drugs for free; subsistence selling; selling by 
people who are struggling to control their own drug use; 
drug-induced homicide charges; and conspiracy charges 
against low-level actors in drug supplying hierarchies.
  Prosecutors should not prosecute family members 
of people who sell drugs for conduct that does not 
constitute substantive involvement in drug selling or 
distribution, such as witnessing drug transactions or 
taking phone messages related to drug selling.
  Prosecutors should treat drug cases as possession for 
personal use unless there is clear evidence that a person 
was involved in selling or distribution for extensive 
financial gain.
  Prosecutors should not seek to enhance sentences based 
on prior drug-related criminal justice contact.
  Prosecutors should stop overcharging drug-involved 
defendants to compel plea bargains or to coerce people 
into becoming confidential informants.
  Prosecutors should take potential immigration 
consequences into account during plea negotiations and 
while considering applications for post-conviction relief.
  Police and prosecutors should collect and publish data on 
arrest, charging and sentencing decisions in all drug cases, 
disaggregated by alleged role in the supply chain, race, 
ethnicity, gender, drug type, and other relevant factors. 
  Police, prosecutors and defense attorneys should 
collaborate in the development of pre-booking and pre-
charge diversion programs aimed specifically at people 
who sell or distribute drugs. They must make every effort 
to minimize the potential immigration consequences of 
participation so that non-citizens are not further harmed 
or excluded from these programs. 
For local, state and federal policymakers:
  Review and revise all sentencing policies that result in 
disproportionate punishments for people convicted 
of drug selling- or distribution-related offenses. 
This includes reforming criminal history sentencing 
enhancements, expanding safety valve provisions, and 
eliminating mandatory minimum sentences so that 
judges may make decisions on an individualized basis.
  Enact defelonization initiatives that reclassify low-
level selling- and distribution-related offenses as 
misdemeanors. 
  In jurisdictions with laws that specify weight thresholds 
for possession, review and revise thresholds to ensure they 
take into account the amount of a drug that a heavy user 
could be reasonably expected to have in their possession. 
Involve people who use drugs in setting these weight 
thresholds. Remove statutory presumptions that amounts 
over the weight threshold are evidence of a supply 
offense.
  Ensure that all sentencing reforms are retroactive, 
allowing for resentencing or offense reclassification for 
people in prison for selling- and distribution-related 
conduct, as well as for those who have already served 
their sentences.
  Repeal criminal penalties for possession and distribution 
of drug paraphernalia to allow for the distribution of 
sterile supplies and the expansion of drug checking 
programs.
  Create funding streams for the distribution of naloxone, 
drug checking equipment, and sterile drug paraphernalia, 
and include people who sell drugs in the distribution of 
these materials.
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  Expand 911 Good Samaritan laws to decriminalize 
selling- and distribution-related offenses at the scene of 
an overdose, to encourage bystanders to call 911 without 
fear of criminalization. Publicize these laws widely to 
maximize their effectiveness. 
  Repeal drug-induced homicide laws.
  Amend federal immigration laws and practices to 
ensure that decision-makers in all immigration-related 
proceedings assess a person’s case on an individualized 
basis, regardless of criminal justice contact. Decision-
makers should assess the actual harm caused by a person’s 
specific conduct, rather than relying on stereotypical, 
homogenized understandings of people who sell drugs.
  Amend federal immigration law to limit the amount 
of time that immigration decision-makers can take 
past criminal justice conduct into account in their 
deliberations.
  Amend federal immigration law to prohibit decision-
makers from taking into account convictions that have 
been expunged, sealed, pardoned or vacated, or are 
otherwise not recognized by the jurisdictions where they 
occurred.
  Consult with immigration law experts when pursuing 
any criminal justice reforms, to ensure that those without 
citizenship are able to benefit from these reforms to the 
maximum extent possible.
  Repeal laws, revise policies, and eliminate practices that 
obstruct access to housing, employment, education, 
professional licensing, credit and financial aid on the basis 
of a person’s criminal record.
  Provide funding for re-entry programs that support 
people leaving prison, helping them access stable housing, 
legal employment, and social welfare programs.
  Policymakers should include people who are or have been 
involved in drug selling- and distribution-related activity 
in every step of the policymaking process.
For service providers:
  Provide retail-level drug sellers with the information they 
need to: educate themselves and their customers about 
drug effects and overdose risk; distribute sterile drug 
paraphernalia such as syringes, cookers and pipes; provide 
naloxone and naloxone training to their customers; and 
disseminate drug checking information and supplies. 
  Develop community-based mentoring programs led by 
former drug sellers and distributors, to encourage safer 
selling practices and violence reduction in markets where 
violence is an issue.
For advocates, journalists and other cultural 
influencers:
  Learn about the racialized and stigmatizing history of 
media and pop culture representations of people who 
sell and distribute drugs, while holding each other 
accountable for disseminating more accurate, nuanced 
representations. 
  Educate policymakers about the nuanced and diverse 
reality of supply-side drug market activity, as well as the 
failures of the current system of criminalization.
For researchers: 
  Pursue comparative research on drug markets, including: 
Online and offline drug markets.
Geographically variable markets, including those in 
urban, suburban and rural areas, as well as in different 
regions of the country.
The way that drug market dynamics have shifted 
over time in response to changing demand, policy 
environments, and other factors.
Drug markets serving low-, middle- and high-income 
clientele, and differently racialized clientele.
Indoor and outdoor drug markets.
Markets where buyers and sellers don’t know each 
other outside of the sales relationship, as well as 
markets that are dominated by social networks.
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Markets that are more organized (e.g. involving 
established, hierarchical organizations) and those that 
are more casual or localized.
Markets that primarily involve youth buyers and/or 
sellers.
Markets that exist in the communities where sellers 
and/or buyers live compared to markets where people 
travel from elsewhere to engage in transactions.
Markets involving a variety of different types of drugs.
Markets in which individuals are able to access 
relatively reliable products and information and those 
that are more unpredictable.
  Examine the factors that lead some drug markets to 
involve violence while others operate nonviolently, and 
use this research to participate in the development and 
evaluation of programs designed to guide more volatile 
drug markets to take more stable forms.
  Attempt to gather further data on the demographics of 
people involved on the supply side of the drug economy, 
across multiple roles and levels in the hierarchy when 
possible. Current research gaps in need of particularly 
urgent attention include the experience of non-Black and 
non-Latinx people of color; LGBTQIA+ and non-binary 
people; and women across multiple ages, classes and racial 
groups.
  Assess the drug quantities that people who use drugs can 
be reasonably expected to have in their possession, taking 
into account geographical variations (urban versus rural, 
as well as regional differences) and use experience (e.g. 
level of tolerance), to provide an evidence base for the 
creation of realistic weight thresholds when necessary.
  Research the ways that people who sell drugs are already 
involved in harm reduction initiatives, evaluate the 
impacts of these activities, and analyze existing barriers to 
their further involvement.
  Continue to research the impact of law enforcement 
crackdowns on people who use drugs and retail-level 
drug sellers, including the possible links between such 
crackdowns and spikes in overdose rates.
  Conduct more thorough research on the types of policies 
and incentives that actually work to get people out of 
drug selling or distribution in a sustainable way.
  Further explore the role that economic and social 
conditions play in people’s decisions to participate in 
drug markets, and the kinds of social policies that can 
impact these decisions.
  Include people who are or have been involved in drug 
selling- and distribution-related activity in every step of 
the research processes.
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Looking Ahead: 
Key Questions for Reformers 
While there are many ways to begin reforming our approach 
to the supply side of the drug economy, significant questions 
remain about what a comprehensive reform agenda in this 
area should look like. Beyond the incremental policy changes 
outlined above, we must fundamentally rethink the way that 
the criminal justice system categorizes and responds to people 
who sell and distribute drugs. Below, we lay out nine key 
questions that drug policy reformers must grapple with going 
forward. We hope that they become a starting point for future 
conversations involving policymakers, advocates, community 
groups, and people who use and sell drugs. 
Absent threats, coercion, exploitation, corruption 
and conduct that causes physical harm to another 
person, should volitional behavior between adults 
related to drug selling or distribution be sanctioned? 
If so, on what basis?
We need to build a system that takes into account what a 
particular person actually does and what harms they actually 
cause when assessing what sanctions, if any, are appropriate. 
Coercive behavior, physical harm to others, and adults 
enlisting minors to assist with selling and distribution-related 
activities likely require some sort of intervention. Knowingly 
cutting drugs with a harmful product or knowingly 
misrepresenting the content or potency of drugs to customers 
may also be an issue. However, we must recognize how 
challenging it is for any individual who works on the lower 
tiers of a supply chain to get accurate information about 
the composition of an illegal product. We must also explore 
whether drug conspiracy laws are necessary for capturing any 
of this truly problematic behavior, and (if they are necessary at 
all) how they can be reformed to minimize their vulnerability 
to abuse.
To the extent that it is necessary to do so, how 
should decision-makers determine whether someone 
possesses drugs solely for personal use or whether 
they are also involved in selling or distribution? 
On p.28, we argue that the way the criminal justice 
system currently decides who is involved in drug selling 
or distribution and what their role is in the hierarchy is 
nonsensical and results in severely unjust outcomes. It is clear 
that drug quantity, drugs packaged in separate baggies, or the 
presence of scales or cash are problematic when used as the 
sole indicators of sales-related conduct, and that they are easily 
abused by law enforcement. Is it necessary for the system 
to make this distinction at all? Or should we work toward a 
system that focuses more on someone’s harmful conduct – 
their involvement in violence, for example – and not on the 
specific nature of their drug involvement? To the extent that 
the system should assess whether someone is involved in drug 
selling or distribution, this assessment must be based on fair 
indicia of sale. The burden must be on law enforcement to 
clearly demonstrate that an individual does not possess drugs 
solely for their personal use before pursuing a sales-related 
arrest or prosecution. 
To the extent that drawing a distinction between low-
level sellers and distributors and other sellers and 
distributors may be strategically necessary when 
pursuing reform, how should this determination be 
made? 
It is both empirically challenging and ethically sticky to 
draw lines between two (or more) levels of involvement with 
the supply-side of the drug economy. However, drawing a 
distinction between low-level sellers or distributors and those 
who operate higher up in the hierarchy may be strategically 
necessary when pursuing reforms. We must ensure that to the 
extent that we must draw these lines, we are drawing them in 
ways that are as accurate and fair as possible. The amount of 
a drug that someone possesses, as we have seen, is not at all 
related to their place in the hierarchy. More accurate metrics 
are necessary, perhaps including such factors as whether 
an individual was involved in profit-sharing in the supply 
network or how many people they supervise.
To the extent that proportionate punishment may 
be appropriate for some distribution-related activity, 
how should we assess proportionality? 
The severity of punishment for drug selling- and distribution-
related activity originated in part with the belief that people 
who sell drugs are more or less murderers: as the 1951 New 
York Times story said, drug sellers were thought to kill 
“hundreds of people, slowly but surely.”339 This is an extremely 
inaccurate assessment of the harms caused by people involved 
in drug selling or distribution, and the penalties that flowed 
from this way of thinking are vastly disproportionate to the 
actual harm caused in most cases. But to the extent that some 
people who sell or distribute drugs do cause harm, how should 
we assess its severity to determine what consequences would 
be proportionate and appropriate?
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What factors lead some drug markets to involve 
violent interactions, while others operate 
nonviolently? 
As noted above, the limits of existing research mean 
that, while we know some drug markets involve violent 
interactions and others operate nonviolently, we do not 
have a comprehensive understanding of the factors that 
determine these differences. Scholars hypothesize that a 
variety of characteristics of drug markets may influence their 
relationship to violence, including: the proximity of the 
market to international borders,340 gang dynamics (or lack 
thereof ) within the distribution network,341 the age of the 
participants,342 whether drugs are typically transported in bulk 
or in smaller amounts,343 the size of the community where 
drug selling is taking place,344 the value by volume of the 
drugs sold, the intensity of law enforcement, whether buyers 
and sellers come from the neighborhood or municipality 
where they are selling or whether they travel from elsewhere 
to conduct transactions,345 the availability of weapons, and 
the overall stability of the market.346 Some have speculated 
that the emergence of new technologies such as cell phones 
and online platforms for drug transactions have reduced 
the prevalence of drug market-related violence by making 
transactions more predictable and less reliant on foot traffic.347
We need more comparative research on drug markets to tease 
out the role of each of these factors. Advocates must then 
work to devise appropriate and effective policy responses to 
reduce drug market-related violence where it exists. While 
existing violence reduction programs such as those run by 
Advance Peace provide an ideal place to start, there is much 
more work to be done.
Are there circumstances in which it is legitimate for 
drug selling- and distribution-related penalties to 
vary by drug type, and if so on what basis?
The degree of criminalization of supply-side drug market 
activity has frequently varied by drug type: generally, the selling 
or distribution of drugs that are perceived to be more dangerous 
is more harshly punished. This approach is often implemented 
problematically, as discussed on p. 34. We need to grapple with 
whether there are circumstances when the system should treat 
people involved with different kinds of drugs differently when 
they engage in otherwise similar conduct.
What modes of accountability other than 
incarceration are appropriate responses to drug 
market-related conduct that merits intervention or 
sanction? 
In some cases, sanctions or some other mode of accountability 
may be appropriate responses to problematic supply-side 
drug market behavior. However, we must look beyond 
incarceration and explore approaches that genuinely reduce 
recidivism and improve community well-being. We need 
ways to hold people accountable for their actions and to 
repair harm they cause, with a focus on support, healing, and 
rehabilitation for everyone involved. Locking people up for 
their roles on the supply side of the drug economy has not 
been in the best interest of public health or public safety, and 
we urgently need to consider different options. Many different 
models for restorative justice already exist in various parts 
of the country, and we should examine these models to see 
how they can best meet the needs of those impacted by drug 
distribution-related harm.
How can policymakers best address the economic 
challenges and lack of opportunity that push many 
people into the illegal drug economy?
Many people who are involved in drug selling or distribution 
– and a disproportionate number of the people who are 
criminalized for it – would not be involved if they had 
access to dignified, living-wage employment or adequate 
social assistance. Drug policy reformers have not typically 
gotten involved in debates about minimum wage, large-scale 
jobs programs, or expanding welfare. A reform agenda for 
the supply side of the drug economy, however, necessarily 
implicates these issues, and drug policy reformers need to 
work with anti-poverty advocates to explore how to position 
themselves in these debates.
What are the potential advantages of legally 
regulating drugs? What are the risks, if any, and 
how can we mitigate them? What models of drug 
regulation would reduce drug market violence, 
enhance consumer safety, and maximize public 
health? (See text box on p. 9.) If we transition to 
the legal regulation of drugs, how can we do so 
in a way that repairs the harms to individuals and 
communities wrought by the criminalization of 
drug selling and distribution? How can we ensure 
that people who previously supported themselves 
through illegal drug market activity have access to 
legal, sustainable and dignified income sources?
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Ultimately, we need to look toward legal regulation as the 
only way to eliminate the harms that flow from the illegal 
drug market. But while thinking about what the most 
effective models for legal regulation look like, we must also 
be thinking about what a just transition to this system looks 
like with respect to those who have been historically involved 
in the illegal market. As has been the case with marijuana 
legalization, the legal regulation of other drugs will inevitably 
impact the livelihoods of those who have been surviving 
off the illegal drug economy, many of whom are among the 
most marginalized people in our society and have few other 
options. As we move toward legal regulation, we must explore 
ways to connect these people with sustainable, dignified 
income-generating opportunities, while considering ways to 
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